The Ryukyuan emigration program to Bolivia as a cold war policy by Iacobelli, Pedro D
The Ryukyuan Emigration Program 
to Bolivia as a Cold War Policy.
A sub-thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Asian
Studies)
Pedro Iacobelli D. 
October 2010.
The Australian National University
Declaration
I, Pedro Iacobelli, declare that this sub-thesis, submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Asian Studies) at the Faculty of 
Asian Studies, Australia National University, Is wholly my own work unless otherwise 
referenced or acknowledged. This sub-thesis has not been submitted for qualifications at 
any other institution.
October 2010
2
Acknowledgments
I would like to acknowledge the support of the following people and institutions 
that made this sub-thesis possible. In first place my wife Ewelina Sikora who supported 
me since the time that we decided to change our comfortable lives in Chile to come to 
Australia and study a master’s program. Also I am most grateful to the following people 
that read and commented this work at different moments: my supervisor Tessa Morris- 
Suzuki, and my friends Andrew de Lisle, Nicolas Lema and Shin Takahashi. Finally, I 
would like to mention the support I received from the Chilean government which 
through its scholarship program sponsored my studies in Australia, and from the 
Australia National University's travel grant which helped me to fund my research in 
Washington D.C.
3
Abstract
This study deals with Cold War Okinawa and the genesis of the emigration 
program that was organised by the U.S. military during the 1950s. As result of the 
postwar agreements with Japan, the United States occupied the Ryukyu Islands and 
began to build a series of military complexes in the Island. The emigrational movement 
from Okinawa to Bolivia was part of a security policy planned by the U.S. authorities to 
maintain social and political stability in the Ryukyu Islands. Therefore, the study of the 
Okinawan emigration program in the 1950s highlights the fact that security 
considerations may play an important part in migration, and thus that both sender and 
receiver states may play a major role in international migration. The Ryukyuan 
emigration program is analyzed utilizing the Hegemonic Stability Theory since it can be 
applied to the relation between the world’s hegemonic nation and international 
migration. The selection of Bolivia as the first hosting country is also studied since the 
U.S. authorities tried not only to put forward security policies in Okinawa but also assist 
friendly governments.
4
Table of Contents
Declaration......................................................................................................................2
Acknowledgments..........................................................................................................3
Abstract...........................................................................................................................4
Table of Contents............................................................................................................5
Introduction.....................................................................................................................7
CHAPTER 1...................................................................................................................13
The Problem of the International Legal Status of the Ryukyu People during the 
A.merican Occupation.................................................................................................... 13
1.1. The “Typhoon of Steel” and the Post-War Situation.......................................... 15
1.2. Creating a new international legal status for Okinawa........................................18
1.2.1. Cold War context and the NSC 13/3.............................................................19
1.2.2. Discussion about the international legal status............................................. 22
1.2.3. SFPT and International Legal Status of Okinawa.........................................29
1.3. Chapter Conclusions............................................................................................33
CHAPTER 2 ..................................................................................................................35
Explaining Emigration in Cold War Okinawa............................................................... 35
2.1. Okinawan migration as labour Diaspora............................................................. 38
2.2. The U.S. rationale for promoting migration........................................................47
2.2.1. Political stability and Communism in Okinawa........................................... 48
2.2.2. The U.S. security policies to reduce social conflict......................................55
2.3. Chapter Conclusions...........................................................................................60
5
CHAPTER 3 62
The Bolivian Connection................................................................................................62
3.1. The U.S. -  Bolivia connection............................................................................. 64
3.2. The “Tigner” connection...................................................................................... 70
3.3. The emigrants’ role in global U.S. policies..........................................................77
3.4. Chapter Conclusions............................................................................................83
CHAPTER 4 ...................................................................................................................85
Conclusion......................................................................................................................85
Bibliography...................................................................................................................89
6
Introduction.
In 2004, to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the arrival of the first post-war 
Okinawan group to eastern Bolivia, representatives of the Japanese, Bolivian, and the 
United States governments and of Okinawa Prefecture gathered in “Colonia Okinawa 
I”.1 2On this occasion, a museum of immigration history, a memorial commemorating 
the dead and a statue of Victor Paz Estenssoro, Bolivian president who encouraged the 
Okinawan immigration in the 1950s, were inaugurated. The attendance of the U.S. 
ambassador at the ceremony reflected the key role that that country had in the migration 
process. The government of the United States through the United States Government of 
the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) and other agencies organised, promoted and funded the 
emigration of thousands of Okinawan people to Bolivia during the 1950s.
Naturally, the Ryukyu Islands as part of the Japanese Empire also took part in 
the emigrational wave to Latin America prior to World War II. The Japanese 
government through private immigration companies organised the emigration of 
Japanese people to Hawaii, Canada, U.S. and Mexico during the last decade of the 
nineteenth century.3 However, due to the new immigration restrictions imposed by the 
U.S. in 1908 on migration to North America, the Japanese emigration changed 
destination towards Latin America particularly Brazil and Peru.4 Bolivia was a minor 
receiver of Japanese/Okinawan immigrants during the wave before the World War II.
1 Kozy Amemiya, "Celebrating Okinawans in Bolivia," The Ryukyuanist, no. 65 (2004).
2 Ibid.
3 James L. Tigner, "Japanese Immigration into Latin America: A Survey," Journal o f Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs 23, no. 4 (1981). p.477.
4 For early migration to U.S.; Brazil and Peru see: Eiichiro Azuma, "Japanese Migration: Historical 
Overview 1868 -  2000," in Encyclopedia o f Japanese Descendants in the Americas, ed. Akemi Kihumura 
and Yano Imouye (New York: AltaMira Press, 2002). p.31 Robert J Smith, "The Ethnic Japanese in Brazil" 
Journal o f Japanese Studies 5, no. 1 (1979). p.57. and Isabelle Lausent -  Herrera, Pasado Y Presente De 
La Comunidad Japonesa En El Peru Colecciön Minima (Lima: IEP, 1991). p.25.
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Most of the immigrants who entered Bolivia did so after going to Peru or as rubber 
workers in the northwest of the country. When the rubber business declined they moved 
to the city of Riberalta/ The result of the pre-war Japanese immigration in Bolivia was 
a modest number of Okinawans (less than one hundred) in the east of the country.5 6
The Pacific war and the later allied occupation of Japan (1945-1952) and U.S. 
occupation of Okinawa (1945-1972) limited the emigration to those who were invited to 
migrate by relatives in foreign countries. Japan and Okinawa were occupied as result of 
the Pacific War and within few years they became involve in a new front. As Kimie 
Hara states, ‘'before the war could be ended with clear settlements, Japan become 
involved in the ‘cold w ar”. 7 This study deals with Cold War Okinawa and the 
emigration program that was organised by the U.S. military.
Due to the particularities of the Ryukyuan emigration program contemporary 
migration theories do not quite fit the Okinawan case.8 Theories of migration most 
commonly highlight the economic “push" and “pull" factors that drive people to 
migrate. In the Ryukyu Islands the U.S. military government “directed” the emigration 
to Bolivia as the only option (at first) for the Okinawans willing to leave. Hence, the 
Okinawan emigrational movement in the early 1950s does not correspond exclusively 
with economic oriented theories since the hosting country was not chosen for the
5 lyo Kunimoto, "Japanese Bolivian Historical Overview," in Encyclopedia o f Japanese Descendants in the 
Americas: An Illustrated History o f the Nikkei, ed. Akemi Kikumura-Yano (New York: AltaMira Press,
2002). pp.101-102.
6 By 1941 the total number of Japanese in Bolivia was about 200 people. According to the data that J. 
Tigner gives 74 of them were Okinawans. Daniel Masterson and Sayaka Funada-Classen, The Japanese in 
Latin America (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004). p.113. and James Lawrence Tigner, 
"The Ryukyuans in Bolivia," Hispanic American Historical Review 43, no. 2 (1963). p.212.
7 Kimi Hara, "50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and Japan's Territorial 
Problems," Pacific Affairs 74, no. 3 (2001). p.381.
8 The terms Okinawa and Ryukyu are used in this work as synonyms and they have no other meaning 
than the geographical.
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immigrants.9 Even though there were economic factors that propelled emigration, 
Bolivia in the 1950s was not richer than Okinawa and in fact in the late 1950s it was 
much poorer. In addition, most of the contemporary international migration theories are 
focused primarily on the policies of the receiving country rather than in the sender state; 
but, in the Ryukyuan emigration case, policies and the program of migration were 
organised from the sending state and the destination was almost irrelevant for the 
emigres.10 The Okinawan movement was not spontaneous but “encouraged” by the 
state; thus, the main focus needs to be put on the rationale behind the U.S. “direction” of 
the emigration movement as well as considering the socioeconomic causes that 
propelled migration.
My main argument is that during the Cold War United States’ strategic 
objectives in the region shaped the socio-political conditions of the Okinawan people. 
Consequently, the Ryukyu Emigration Program in 1950s was a reflection of the LhS. 
hegemonic position and its security policy in Asia. In other words, the emigrational 
movement from Okinawa to Bolivia was part of a security policy planned by the U.S. 
authorities to maintain social and political stability in the Ryukyu Islands and by 
extension to protect U.S. interests in the region.
I have found useful to approach the Ryukyuan emigration program from the 
“Hegemonic Stability Theory” (HST). Although this theory deals with the international 
economic system, it can be adapted to migration theories as some authors suggest.* 11 The 
original HST suggests that international economic system is determined by the
9 A summary of economics oriented theories can be found in Douglas S. Massey et al., "Theories of 
International Migration: A Review and Appraisal," Population and Development Review 19, no. 3 (1993). 
p.433-444.
10 James F. Hollifield, "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We "Bring the State Back In"?," in 
Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines, ed. Caroline B. Brettele and James F. Hollifield (New York: 
Routledge, 2000). pp.138-139.
11 James F. Hollifield, "Migration and International Relations: Cooperation and Control in the European 
Community," International Migration Review 26, no. 2 (1992).
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distribution of power among states. In a hegemonic distribution of power a single state 
has a predominance of power that is most conducive to the establishment of a stable, 
open international economic system. The hegemon will be responsible for performing 
certain functions such as organize trade liberalization, manage international monetary 
system and so forth. The United States was the hegemon in the years after the World 
War II until the emergence of other strong economies like Japan, Germany and the 
Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s. So during these about twenty years as hegemon 
the U.S. had the responsibility to provide stability to the liberal world. Following this 
reasoning, we could expect rules governing the movement of people to be influenced by 
the interests of the dominant state. This thesis approaches Okinawa migration in the 
1950s by cxaming whether, in permitting emigration, the U.S. was providing a means to 
sustain the international order, not only in economic terms but also, in the context of a 
war against international communism, in political and strategic terms. In this sense, I 
will explore the hypothesis that the rationale behind the promotion of emigration to 
Bolivia and elsewhere was to protect the general U.S. interests in the Ryukyu Islands so 
as to ensure the fulfilment of its self-defined duty as guardian of the liberal world.
The bibliography dealing directly with the Okinawan emigration to Bolivia in
the 1950s is limited. I have found the work of James Tigner, Amemiya Kozy and
Suzuki Taku very enlightening. James Tigner was the academic that surveyed the
Japanese communities in Tatin America in the early 1950s so as to find a suitable
location for the Okinawa emigration. His work for the U.S. military was the basis of his
PhD dissertation in the 1950s and the core of his academic research. In sum, his
contribution to the study of the early emigrational movement comes from his own
experience as one of the architects of the emigration program. Amemiya Kozy, a
12 Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment," 
Review o f International Studies 15, no. 2 (1989).
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scholar of the Japan Policy Research Institute of the University of San Francisco, had 
published many articles and book chapters dealing with the issue. In my understanding 
she was the first to suggest that the Ryukyuan emigration program was organised to 
deal with the political (and not only demographic) situation in Okinawa. She has also 
highlighted the role of the local pre-war Okinawan Bolivian community in the 
immigration planning. Finally, Suzuki Taku from Denison University provides an 
anthropological perspective of the Okinawan communities in Bolivia.
As for primary sources utilized in this study, 1 have used concerning the United 
States government: the Foreign Relations of the United States series (FRUS) from 1949 
until 1960 for both regions Japan and Latin America; The State Department Bulletin 
from 1950 to 1960, and some of the USCAR published materials found in the National 
Library of Australia and in the Menzies Library at the Australian National University. 
For ordinances, acts and laws concerning the Government of the Ryukyu Islands I have 
consulted the compendium of laws and regulation during the U.S. administration of 
Okinawa edited by the Gekkan Okinawa Sha. Also I had the opportunity to investigate 
in the National Archives of the United States, College Park, where I found information 
related with the emigration program and general documents about the U.S. military 
government in Okinawa. Finally, I have researched newspaper articles (Nippon Times 
and New York Times) and consulted articles written in the period in various magazines 
and journals.
My approach to the topic begins with an analysis of the conditions in Okinawa 
that propelled emigration. I then explore the U.S.’ rationale to organise, fund and 
promoted the migration program. I also consider that there were also other factors 
involved in the migration movement such as the role of Bolivia in the U.S. hegemonic
11
plans in the other side of the Pacific or the role of the local Okinawan community in 
Bolivia.
This study is divided into three chapters. In Chapter One I discuss the process 
that left Okinawa under the control of the U.S. military particularly the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty’s article III and the “Residual Sovereignty” concept. As I explain, these 
had an important bearing on postwar migration. In the second chapter I will analyse the 
process whereby the U.S. came to view the promotion of migration as a security policy 
in Okinawa. The American occupation and the militarization of the islands evoked 
discontent because of the social, economic, and political disruption to the lives of 
islanders. The emigration program was meant to deal both with these issues and with 
the increase of population. In the third chapter, I will discuss two different sets of 
connections that made the Ryukyu emigration program to Bolivia possible and 
convenient for the U.S. First, the relation between the U.S. and Bolivia in the 1950s; 
and second, the connections between the local Okinawan community in Bolivia and the 
U.S. authorities, particularly the role of James Tigner. Finally, I argue that the body of 
the immigrants came to represent and play a key role in global U.S. policies.
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CHAPTER 1
The Problem of the International Legal Status of the Ryukyu People during the
American Occupation
This chapter analyses the international legal status of Okinawa during the period 
of the American occupation. I will discuss the process that left Okinawa totally 
dependent of the U.S. military particularly the San Francisco Peace Treaty’s article III 
and the “Residual Sovereignty” concept. This is relevant for the study of the Okinawan 
migration to Latin America since the construction of an ambiguous and U.S. dominated 
Okinawa's international status allowed the United States to pursue policy in the island 
without informing either the Japanese government or the United Nations. Also, the 
shaping of Okinawa's people nationality (or lack of one) after the Second World War 
needs to be considered as a cause that propelled emigration. Finally, the study of the 
process by which the U.S. military dominated the Ryukyu Islands shed lights on the 
American anti-communist discourse in East Asia.
From an historical perspective, the Okinawan people have had a constantly 
changing international status since the fifteen century and further there have been 
periods of long ambiguity in its international status. They were inhabitants of the 
independent Ryukyu Kingdom (unified in 1429) which engaged in trade with China as
I T .part of the latter’s tribute system. During the Ming dynasty in China, the Ryukyu
Kingdom became a major agent in the entreport trade reaching ports in the Sea of Japan,
13 The Chinese concepts of Zhonggou and Tianxia describe the relationship between China and the rest 
of the world during this period see Edward Wang, "History, Space and Ethnicity: The Chinese World 
View," Journal o f World History 16, no. 2 (1999). Pp. 287-288. For the Chinese tributary system see 
Gregory Smits, Visions o f Ryukyu, Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai Press, 1999). pp. 35-36. For a classic study on this subject see J.K. Fairbanks and S.Y. 
Teng, "On the Ch1 Ing Tributary System," Harvard Journal o f Asiatic Studies 6, no. 2 (1941).
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Yellow Sea, North China Sea and South China Sea.14 Then, during the reign of the Qing 
dynasty, the Okinawan people became ambivalent citizens of a state with two lords 
(Chinese empire and Satsuma daimyo).Ir' In 1609 the Shimazu house invaded the 
Ryukyu Kingdom and since Satsuma’s main interest was to foster trade with China 
through Okinawa, the government in Shuri was allowed to rule the kingdom whilst 
maintaining tributary trade with both China and Satsuma.16 Finally, Meiji Japan, using 
the discourse of enlightening its neighbours, ended up colonising and annexing some of 
them.17 In 1879 the Ryukyu kingdom was formally abolished and reorganised as 
Okinawa Prefecture, ruled by a governor appointed by the central government in 
Tokyo.18 Okinawa’s international legal status changed once more during the end of the 
Pacific war. The war and the period that immediately followed it resulted in the status 
of Okinawa, as part of Imperial Japan, being transformed by the terms of the Potsdam 
declaration into the temporary status of occupied enemy territory.
My main argument in this chapter is that in order to pursue their strategic aims 
in the Pacific and Asia during the first years of the Cold War, the American authorities 
(particularly in the Department of State) designed an ambiguous international legal 
status for the Okinawan people so that they could: a) retain Okinawa under U.S.
14 George H. Kerr, Okinawa, the History o f an Island People, 1969 ed. (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. 
Tuttle Co., 1958). pp. 124-135. Some authors consider this period from late fourteen century to early 
sixteen century to be the most prosperous age in history of the Ryukyu kingdom. See Mitsugu Matsuda 
Atsushi Kobata, Ryukyuan Relation with Korea and South Sea Countries: An Annotated Translation o f the 
Documents in the Rekidai Hoan (Atsushi Kobata, 1969). p. v.
15 For an analysis of the geopolitical consequences of the change of Chinese dynasty for the maritime 
trade see Wang, "History, Space and Ethnicity: The Chinese World View." p.304. and for the Chinese- 
European relations see D.E. Mungello, The Great Encounter o f China and the West, 1500-1800 
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999). pp.11-18.
16 Smits, Visions o f Ryukyu, Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics, p.18. The 
relationship between Japan, the Ryukyu kingdom and the Chinese empire formed a triangle that lasted 
from 1609 to 1879.Glenn Hook and Richard Siddle, "Introduction," in Japan and Okinawa: Structure and 
Subjectivity, ed. Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003). p.l.
17 Prasenjit Duara, "The Global and Regional Constitution of Nations: The View from East Asia," Nations 
and Nationalism 14, no. 2 (2008). pp.21-23.
18 Kerr, Okinawa, the History o f an Island People, pp. 382-400.
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military control, b) transform the archipelago into a main military hub in the Pacific, 
and c) appease the Japanese government claims of sovereignty. The term international 
status is defined in this work as the understanding from the international community of 
the citizenship position of the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands. Similarly, the term 
international legal status refers to the recognition of the international status of the 
archipelago in legal instruments. In other words, both terms refer to the recognition 
from other states of the citizenship of the Okinawa's people.
I will examine in this chapter two aspects: the resulting human and international 
legal position of the Okinawa’s people immediate after the war, and then, the process 
whereby the American authorities articulated a new international legal status for the 
Okinawa prefecture.
1.1. The “Typhoon of Steel’’ and the Post-War Situation.
It was in the last phase of the Second World War, after the Allies' victory in Iwo 
Jima and when the Japanese Empire had lost almost all the territories conquered during 
the war, that the U.S. troops began the invasion of Okinawa. This battle is considered 
the bloodiest battle fought in the Pacific.19 It started with air raids of U.S. B-29 over the 
main cities and then was followed by the invasion by U.S. troops. The battle began on 
March 26, 1945 when U.S. forces landed in Kerama Islands and concluded on 
September 7, 1945 when the Japanese Defence Task Forces of the Southwestern Islands 
signed the surrender document. This battle and the war in general, changed the lives of 
the survivors and their international status.
19 James H. Hallas, Killing Ground on Okinawa: The Battle fo r Sugar Loaf Hill (Westport: Praeger, 1996). 
P.l.
20 Masahide Ota, "Re-Examining the History of the Battle of Okinawa," in Okinawa: Cold War Island, ed. 
Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999). Pp. 13-14. Most textbooks date the 
Battle of Okinawa between April 1st and June 23 d of 1945. However, I consider Ota's dates to be more
15
In terms of the human toll, the civilians during the battle suffered all the horrors of 
the war. The Battle of Okinawa resulted in a civilian catastrophe where people, as Bill 
Sloan described it, “(...) died like flies without regard to age gender, or degree of 
innocence. Frail old men, pregnant women, mother clutching newborns, round-faced 
toddlers, barefoot cripples, sailor-suited school girls -an estimated 140,000 in all maybe 
more. Almost every surviving Okinawa combat veteran saw civilians who had been 
killed, civilians being killed, or civilians killing themselves.” Although, there is no 
definitive number of civilian casualties, it is believed that around 200,000 people in
9Ttotal died and many more were injured.
The international status of the survivors was defined by the situation of war between 
the U.S. and Japan; hence, from the end of the battle of Okinawa until the enforcement 
of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in April 1952, the Ryukyu Islands remained occupied 
enemy territory.74 Although this was a temporary situation, at the time no one (including 
the occupiers) had a clear image of the definitive international legal status which the 
Ryukyu Islands should have after the end of the occupation situation. The official war 
covenants did not say much about this particular aspect. The Cairo Communique 
vaguely stated that “Japan will also be expelled from all other territories she has taken 
by violence or greed” but failed to name which ones. The Yalta Agreement did not 
mention nor allude in any way to the Ryukyu Islands and finally the Potsdam
inclusive with the events that happened in Kerama islands in March and also with the events after the 
suicide of the officers in command of the Japanese 32nd Army (June 23rd) such as localized combat 
between the U.S. troops and some of the officials that were hidden in caves.
21 Bill Sloan, The Ultimate Battle: Okinawa 1945 -the Last Epic Struggle o f World War li (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 2007). p.296.
22 For testimonies of the battle of Okinawa see Hiromichi Yahara, The Battle fo r Okinawa, trans. Roger 
Pineau and Masatoshi Uehara (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995). p.105. and George Feifer, 
Tennozan: The Battle o f Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992). p.446.
23 This figure includes military personnel. http://www.peace-
museum. pref.okinawa.jp/english/museum/parmanent/2.html visited on April 7, 2010.
24 Arnold G. Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands. 1945 -1950, 2005 ed. (Honolulu: University 
Press of the Pacific, 1988). P.4.
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Declaration, in one infamous sentence, consolidated the aura of ambiguity surrounding 
the future of the islands when stated that the Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the 
main four island and “such minor islands as we determine”. Also, following the 
Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Communique, the U.S. (the occupying force) could not 
seek aggrandisement and thus could not attempt to annex Okinawa as they had done in 
the past with other territories; for instance, with Guam in 1898.“ In sum, the issue of 
Okinawa remained until 1951 a corollary to the issue of a peace treaty between Japan 
and formers enemies.27
Finally, Okinawa also had a changing status within the U.S. military. The U.S. 
Navy was the military branch responsible for the administration of occupied Okinawa 
during the last weeks of the Second World War until July 1946 when it surrendered all 
administrative authority to the Army. The Ryukyu Islands were from 1947, under the 
jurisdiction of the General Mead Quarters of the Far East Command GHG/FECOM. 
General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief Far East from December 1946 and 
therefore in charge of occupied Okinawa, contributed to downgrading the status of 
Okinawa within the American occupation structure by appointing men that he did not 
consider good enough to be close to him in Japan to serve there." To a certain extent, 
Okinawa was the American version of a place of exile: a duty station to which only the 
worst were sent. Frank Gibney reported in Time magazine in 1949, that the morale and
25 For the Cairo Communique see
http://www.ndl.RQ.ip/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002 46/002 46tx.html; for the Yalta Agreement see 
http://www.ndl.RO.jP/constitution/e/etc/c04.html; and for the Potsdam declaration, 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/potsdam.htm, all sites visited on April 7, 2010.
26 From 1944, Guam was initially designed as a naval station under naval military government. It is today 
an unincorporated territory of the U.S. Kensei Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. 
Occupation, ed. Edward H. Kaplan, vol. 23, Studies on East Asia (Bellingham: Western Washington 
University, 2001). pp.xiv-xvi.
27 Fisch, M ilitary Government in the Ryukyu Islands. 1945 -1950. p.55.
28 Eiji Takemae, Inside G.H.Q. : The Allied Occupation o f Japan and Its Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and 
Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002). pp.121-123.
29 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake o f World War li (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1999). p.222.
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discipline of U.S. troops in Okinawa “have probably been worse than that of any U.S. 
force in the world(...)”. The military structure governing Okinawa was again changed 
in December 1950 when the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands 
(USCAR) was formed. In the new structure the Commander in Chief, Far East was the 
Governor of Okinawa. The Commanding General, Ryukyu Command was the Deputy 
Governor (and from 1957 called High Commissioner), and the military structure was 
completed with the “Civil Administrator” who was until 1962 an army active duty 
member, usually an Army Brigadier General.
The battle of Okinawa radically changed the situation of the inhabitants of the island 
in many respects. The hardship of the battle was a traumatic experience for the 
survivors since it cost the lives of a significant percentage of the local population, 
injured many more and destroyed the productivity in the island. But what is more 
significant for the purpose of this study, the triumph of the U.S. troops in Okinawa 
changed the international status of the islands to occupied enemy territory. Even though 
the nature of the international status for the islands was temporary, by the end of the war 
the future of the archipelago and its inhabitants remained uncertain.
1.2. Creating a new international legal status for Okinawa.
By the end of the war in September 1945 Japan was occupied by allied forces. 
However the status of Okinawa did not follow the same pattern as mainland Japan. On
30 Frank Gibney, "Okinawa: Forgotten Island," TIME, Nov. 28, 1949.
31 Mikio Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa (Vancouver University of British Columbia, 1963). 
pp.23-24.
32 Ibid.
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the contrary, the Ryukyu Islands once again, had their international - legal- status 
modified by an external power in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 (SFPT).
1.2.1. Cold War context and the NSC 13/3.
Although there is not a precise date for stating the beginning of the Cold War, by the 
end of the 1940s the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had already taken antagonist positions in 
world's geopolitics.14 The civil war in China and the subsequent Communist victory in 
addition to the war in Korea gave to the Cold War a definitive Asian flavour at least 
during its first years. Consequently, the American authorities needed to adjust their 
plans in the region particularly in Japan in response to the new context, so (after initially 
focusing on policies to “punish” Japan) they decided to adopt a “reverse course” and 
begin rearming their former enemy as a Cold War partner with the assistance of less 
liberal elements of Japanese society.331 Likewise, although the Secretary of State James 
F. Byrnes once suggested the return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, Okinawa was seen 
by the U.S. authorities (particularly the military) as a vital base during the Cold War.
The American policy in Asia was strongly influenced by the outcome of the Chinese 
civil war. One of the lessons from that conflict was that American aid was not enough 
for securing the U.S. position in any territory. As Secretary Acheson stated in August 
1949, “the situation in China serves to emphasize a vital factor in connection with the 
question of United States aid to foreign nations (...), it cannot guarantee that that aid
33 As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the term international legal status refers to the 
recognition in a legal instrument of the international status of Japan.
34 The Yalta agreement in 1945 together with the Churchill's Iron curtain speech (1946), the enactment 
by the Congress of the Truman doctrine (1947) and the Berlin blockade (1948-9) are good examples of 
the division of the world in the second hand of the 1940s.
35 Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War li. Pp.23-24.
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oz.
will achieve its purpose.” In his opinion, stated a few months later, the reason for the 
communist victory lay primarily in the bad governance of the Nationalist Government 
which ignored the needs of the Chinese people, leaving them open to the appeal of 
communism. If aid was not sufficient to halt communism, other policies had to be 
taken in order to secure American interests in the region.
The Military and staff of the Department of State discussed the future of Okinawa 
within this new context on a number of occasions. For instance, Max W. Bishop, (Chief 
of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs) at a meeting with William J. Sebald and D. 
MacArthur in February 1949 stated that “the Department of State had attached great 
importance to the rapid development of Okinawa as a strong base (...) and had shown 
its willingness to support in every feasible way the military development of our position 
in Okinawa”. Similarly, as reported by W.J. Sebald, General MacArthur considered 
that the westernmost line of defence of the U.S. should be in the Pacific island chain 
from Kamchatka southward to and including the Philippines.30 This idea was echoed by 
the Secretary Acheson when he explained in the National Press Club that “This 
defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We 
hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to 
hold”.40 Since it was clear for military men and officers of the State Department that the 
U.S. position in Okinawa needed to be held, it was a natural step for the National 
Security Council to make the possession of Okinawa a national policy.
36 Dean Acheson, "Basic Principles of the U.S. Policy Towards the Far East," The Department o f State 
Bulletin XXI, no. 528 (1949). P.236.
37 Dean Acheson, "Crisis in Asia -an Examination of the U.S. Policy," The Department o f State Bulletin XXII, 
no. 551 (1950). Pp.111-118.
38 Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1949, vol. VII, The Far East and 
Australasia (in two parts) Part 2. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976). p.655.
39 Ibid. pp.648-649.
40 Acheson, "Crisis in Asia -an Examination of the U.S. Policy." p.116.
20
In the document “Report by the National Security Council on Recommendations 
with Respects to United States Policy Toward Japan”, also known by its code NSC 13/3, 
which was adopted at the NSC’s 23rd meeting May 6, 1949 as a revision of NSC 13/2 
(October 1948) the National Security Council defined a significant part of the future of 
the Ryukyu islanders.41 This document was a response to the Communist advance in 
China and thus called for a postponement of the peace treaty with Japan so that the U.S. 
position in the archipelago could remain unaltered. Since the National Security Council 
felt that the communist expansion was a threat to U.S. interests, one of the main 
objectives of this document was to emphasize the security requirement that a treaty with 
Japan should have. Therefore, the positions expressed in the document were in most 
cases the base of the treaty of 1951. With respect to Okinawa, article 5 of NSC 13/3 
confirms U.S. intentions to “retain on a long-term basis the facilities at Okinawa and 
such other facilities as are deemed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be necessary in the 
Ryukyu Islands (...) the military bases at or near Okinawa should be developed 
accordingly”, therefore the document is clear in stating that the time duration of the 
occupation or at least the presence of bases, was expected to be long term. But this also 
suggests the long term responsibilities of the U.S. agencies involved in the government 
of the civilians: “The United States agencies responsible for administering the above- 
mentioned islands should promptly formulate and carry out a program on a long-term 
basis for the economic and social well-being and, to the extent practicable, for the 
eventual reduction to a minimum of the deficit in the economy of the natives.” The NSC 
13/3 can be considered to be a response to Communism, but also, a recognition that in 
order to secure a vital position in the line of defence, the U.S. could no longer rely in aid 
to the native population as the only means to consolidate their position.
41 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. pp.730-736.
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In other documents such as the NSC 49 and the NSC 60/1 the National Security 
Council complemented the view that bases in Okinawa and the administration of the 
former prefecture should remain under U.S. control. In this regard, the NSC 60/1 of 
September 1950 expressed the view that a future treaty with Japan must guarantee the 
U.S. “Exclusive strategic control” of the Ryukyu.42 The documents produced within the 
NSC show a position of power and control over Okinawa.43 In this regard, the Korean 
War (1950-1953) hastened the conclusion of the Peace Treaty that shaped the final 
international legal status of the Ryukyu, but the basic principles concerning Okinawa 
where set before the civil war in the Korean peninsula.
1.2.2. Discussion about the international legal status.
Although the U.S. national policy towards Okinawa was clear about the need to 
control the islands in a long-term basis, it was still necessary to give this control a form 
that other countries could recognize and accept in a peace treaty. To this end, different 
actors within the U.S. politics and bureaucracy took part in the process of wording of a 
final document. Among the parties in the discussion the U.S. Department of State had a 
leading role, also the Military and to a lesser degree other governments including the 
Japanese discussed the future international status of the Ryukyu Islands.44 The role of 
the Japanese in the discussion related with the Ryukyu Islands was modest since they 
focused their limited political strength on other articles of the treaty such as 
reparations.4^  Similarly, the U.S. congress did not have much participation in the
42Quoted in Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. Occupation, p.45.
43 Position that in the 1950s meant not only the construction of more bases but also hosting nuclear 
weapons. See Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, "Where They Were," Bulletin o f the 
Atomic Scientists 55, no. 6 (Nov/Decl999). And Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, 
"How Much Did Japan Know?," Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists 56, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2000).
44 Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. Occupation, pp.17-26.
45 Nevertheless, the Japanese expressed that it would be a serious mistake to the Ryukyu from Japan 
and solicited reconsideration and a close economic connection with Japan. See Department of State,
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discussion about the peace treaty.46 Academics also took part in the general discussion 
about the future of Okinawa. For instance, Edwin O. Reischauer in his 1950's edition of 
“The United States and Japan“ suggested two reasonable solutions for the problem: 
either making the Ryukyu Islands an integral part of Japan or make it a trusteeship 
territory under the U.S. control. The option of a trusteeship would have strategic 
advantage for the U.S. but on the other hand, the main difficulty -according to 
Reischauer- could be dealing with the large body of inassimilable aliens and also 
relegating the Ryukyu indefinitely to the status of a colonial people. For Reischauer the 
best option was to keep any Ryukyu trusteeship as small as possible and to return the 
other islands to Japan.47
The trusteeship option for The Ryukyu Island was increasingly seen as the most 
suitable option by the treaty makers. The U.S. as trustee of Okinawa would have full 
management and administrative rights over the islands and at the same time, it will be 
clear for the international society that the U.S. would work for the promotion of the 
inhabitants’ human rights and political, social, economical advancement. Flowever, 
the terms for the trusteeship and relevant issues such as the duration of the trusteeship 
needed to be discussed first. On this matter, Reischauer was correct when he mentioned 
that the relation with the local people would be difficult. As reported by the Director of 
the Office of Far Easter Affairs W.W. Butterworth, increasing anti-U.S. feeling was 
complicating the implementation of the NSC 13/3 and as Douglas L. Oliver suggested
Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1951, vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific (in two parts) Part 1. 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977). pp. 811; 833; 960-961;1163. For a foreign 
observant of the process, the general knowledge that the Japanese had about Okinawa was very limited 
since they"knew little or nothing about Okinawa" See E.G. Seidensticker, "The View from Okinawa," 
Japan Quarterly VI, no. 1 (1959). p.37.
46 Ralph Braibanti, "The Ryukyu Islands: Pawn of the Pacific," The American Political Science Review 
XVVIII, no. 4 (1954). p.974.
47 Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950). 
pp.237-239.
48 Boleslaw Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary (Oxford: Scarecrow Press, 2005). p.142.
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after surveying the islands, a long term occupation was not recommendable.40 However, 
from the NSC 13/3, the control of Okinawa had become a national policy projected in a 
long-term basis; and therefore, a better understanding between the local people and the 
occupiers needed to be arranged in order to proceed with the trusteeship option. This 
was the main reason for creating the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Island, an 
organ that could “develop and maintain the well-being of the civil population and not 
prejudice ultimate decisions with respect to the international status of the Islands and 
their form of government”.50 By the end of 1949 and in 1950 the idea of the regular 
trusteeship had gained important adherents/1 Secretary Acheson confirmed the official 
position of his department by announcing that: “In the interest of the population of the 
Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under 
trusteeship of the United Nations.’02 53 Hence, the trusteeship option together with a 
civil administration of the islands was considered by the official American 
establishment as the best alternative to fulfill the NSC 13/3 guidelines, and as a result it 
was included in all treaty drafts from February 1951.54 In this context the international 
legal status of Okinawa could have changed from the current status of occupied enemy
49 Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1949. p.815. Also William Sebald opposed 
the option for a long-term occupation. Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. Occupation. 
p.45.
J° Proposed Directive by the Joint Chiefs o f S ta ff to the Commander in Chief Far East (MacArthur). 
Washington. November 30, 1949. Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1949. 
p.914.
51 For example the special assistant of J.F. Dulles, John Allison. Department of State, Foreign Relations o f 
the United States, 1951. p.795.
52 Acheson, "Crisis in Asia -an Examination of the U.S. Policy." p.116. and also see Department of State, 
Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1950, vol. VI, East Asia and the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1976). Pp.1161-1163. Moreover in the draft of the peace treaty in August
1950, Dulles left the issue to the United Nations to extend the trusteeship system to all or part of the 
Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1950. p.1268. On 
the other hand, the governments of New Zealand and Canada supported the idea of a full sovereignty 
for the U.S. over the Ryukyu Islands. See Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States,
1951. pp.1057-1062.
53 Also, U.S. partners encouraged that option. See Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United 
States, 1951. pp.909-910; 921.
54 For example, Ibid, p.850.
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to inhabitants of a trust territory, protected by the U.N. Charter but still with a very 
unclear future.
In the United Nations Charter, the mandate system, which had been used by the 
prewar League of Nations, was replaced by the trusteeship system. The former provided 
a mild form of international accountability for administration of mandate territories.55 
The latter came to mean actual supervision by the U.N of trust territories’ 
administration/6 The aim of the Trusteeship System according to the charter is to assist 
the trust territory to attain self governance. In the Trusteeship System there are three 
categories of territories subject to the trusteeship: a- Former Mandates; b- ex-enemy 
territories; c- territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for 
their administration/7 Flowever there are two main limitations to making a territory the 
subject of a trusteeship. First, no member of the United Nations is eligible to become a 
trust territory and second, an independent non member state cannot be put in the 
Trusteeship System because it has already attained self-governance.
Nevertheless, the trusteeship option presented its own inconveniences. In first place, 
the U.S. needed to justify the change of status of the Ryukyu Island to a trust territory 
before the United Nations. This was not particularly difficult since there were two 
reasonable options for the U.S. to apply the Trusteeship System to Okinawa according 
to the U.N. Charter article 77. As mentioned above, the U.S could have presented the 
case of the Ryukyu as a territory detached from an enemy state as result of the Second 
World War, or the U.S. could have arranged with Japan to place the territory under the
55George Thullen, Problems o f the Trusteeship System : A Study o f Political Behavior in the United 
Notions (Geneve: Librairie Droz, 1964). p . l l .
56ln the Mandates System, the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations was 
responsible for supervising the mandates territories but in the practice it did not have real power Ibid.
p.12.
57 Chairmian Edwards Toussaint, The Trusteeship System o f the United Nations (London: Stevens & Sons, 
1956). pp.39-42.
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system voluntarily.58 A more serious issue was that if Japan became a full member of 
the United Nations (which happened in 1956), the trusteeship system could not apply to 
its territory, because the relationship among members “shall be based on respect for the 
principle of sovereign equality”.59 This point could have endangered the U.S. long-term 
possession of the archipelago since Japan after becoming member of the U.N. could 
request the reduction of troops in Okinawa or even the departure of all of them. Also, in 
the case of Japan's entrance to the U.N. and the return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, 
the people of Okinawa had to receive the same rights as the Japanese from mainland, 
thus increasing the civil participation against the U.S. presence, and all during the time 
of the Cold War. Finally, the trusteeship option would have made the U.S. position 
susceptible of criticism from the Security Council of the U.N.60 If the U.S. had chosen 
to place the Ryukyu Island within the Trusteeship System they would have probably 
catalogued it as a Strategic Area and thus bypassed the scrutiny of the General 
Assembly but not the Security Council, the only organ with the authority to approve or 
reject the trusteeship agreement.61 Even though the Trusteeship System offered a proper 
frame for attaining the U.S. strategic objectives in Okinawa (at least in a short-term), the 
potential conflicts within the Trusteeship System made this option less suitable for the 
long-term aspiration of the U.S. authorities over the Ryukyu Islands.
The situation for John F. Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary and main architect of 
the Peace Treaty with Japan, was not easy. Fie needed to meet the guidelines of the
58 Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter o f the United Nations: Commentary and Documents 
(Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1946).p.357.
59 Ibid. In the history of the Trusteeship System the only case of making an ex enemy territory a trust 
territory was when Somalia was trusted to Italy, its former colonial power. There are no cases of 
territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. Toussaint, 
The Trusteeship System o f the United Nations, p.40.
60 And not as Kensei Yoshida suggested from the General Assembly. Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed: 
Okinawa under U.S. Occupation, p.49.
61 Goodrich and Hambro, Charter o f the United Nations: Commentary and Documents pp.359-360.
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National Security Council which required a total control of the islands, and on the other 
hand the aspirations of the Japanese people and the own American commitment of no 
aggrandizement. So he decided to obtain in the peace treaty an option to seek 
trusteeship if desired, but in the meantime have full control of the island. As Dulles 
explained to the Far East Sub-Committee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
March 19, 1951:
“The treaty should give the U.S. the right to apply for a trusteeship if desired. What 
we should ultimately do with the Ryukyu, he suggested, should be made the subject of a 
special inquiry, probably including sending someone out there. The United States 
should not commit itself in the treaty but should simply obtain an option to seek a 
trusteeship if it desired. Senator Smith noted that the draft would permit the United 
States to retain control of the Ryukyus indefinitely if a trusteeship were not secured, and 
inquired whether this would not lay us open to charges of imperialism. Ambassador 
Dulles suggested that the provision be allowed to stand until the attitude of other 
countries could be ascertained.”62
Therefore, he concluded a formula by which Japan would retain formal sovereignty 
over the island but the United States would exercise administrative rights. In the article 
3 of the SFPT the situation of Okinawa was stated as follows.
“Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to 
place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering 
authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29deg. north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands 
and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands,
62 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. p.933. For another document 
stating Dulles position see Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. p.841.
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Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending 
the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will 
have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and 
jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial 
waters.”63
Later, during the second Plenary Session of the SFPT Conference on September 5l\  
Dulles called this policy Residual Sovereignty, which was received in varying ways by 
the international society, Japanese people and Okinawans.64 Forty eight nations agreed 
with the terms of the SFPT and agreed with the idea of leaving the Ryukyu Islands in a 
sort of legal limbo between an occupied enemy territory and a trust territory.6'^ The 
strongest opposition to this point came from the USSR delegate Andrei Gromyko who 
charged that “transfer of the Ryukyus chain, including Okinawa, to the U.S. custody 
was illegal”. 66 However, his position about the Ryukyu contrasted with the one 
concerning the Kurile Islands, also severed from Japan after the war but in his country's 
favor.67 Conversely, in Okinawa and in the rest of Japan, the people considered that the 
trusteeship was a fait accompli. A survey conducted by Asahi Shimbun and replicated 
in the Nippon Times shows that after the signature of the treaty 6% of the Japanese 
people responded “Trusteeship control of the southern islands” when being asked about 
the points of disaffection in the treaty. 1 As reported by the Nippon Times, the pact was 
said to be accepted calmly in Okinawa, and in a note from the Governor of Okinawa he
63 "Treaty of Peace with Japan" in UCLA East Asia Studies Documents at 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/peacel951.htm Visited on April 7, 2010.
64 Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa, pp. 10-12.
65 Twenty Latin American nations signed the treaty including Bolivia.
66 Nippon Times, "Excerpts from Gromyko Speech," Sept. 7 1951.
57 Also during the pre conference negotiations the government of India rejected the idea and thus did 
not attend the SFP Conference. See Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1951. 
pp. 1062; 1269-70;1288-1291.
68 Nippon Times, "Public Opinion Survey on the Japanese Peace Treaty," Sept. 25, 1951.
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stated that: Although the islands will go under U.S. trusteeship, we expect that the 
actual enforcement of the trusteeship will be based, to the maximum, on the inhabitants’ 
desire to have their land returned to Japan”.69 The general impression was that sooner 
rather than later Okinawa would be a formal trust territory; however, the intentions of 
the U.S. government were far from making a formal proposal to the United Nations to 
include the Ryukyu Islands in the Trusteeship System. Rather, Article III and the 
Residual Sovereignty concept confused even more the already complex international 
legal status of the Ryukyu Islands and became the political administrative basis from
70where the U.S. government could maintain control of the Ryukyus for twenty years. 
1.2.3. SFPT and International Legal Status of Okinawa.
The San Francisco peace Treaty of 1951 created an aura of uncertainty concerning 
the international legal status of the Ryukyu Islands and its inhabitants. They would be 
classified “Ryukyuans” under U.S. administration. So they were neither Japanese nor 
American with the protection of neither the Japanese or American constitution.71 The 
SFPT left Okinawa in a position of ongoing ambiguity since no further step to clarify 
the international status of the Ryukyus could be taken without the concurrence of the 
United States. One year after the signature of the peace treaty, the incumbent American 
ambassador in Tokyo Robert Murphy (a complete novice in Asian Affairs) stated to the
69 Nippon Times, "Pact Said Accepted Calmly in Okinawa," Sept. 15 1951.
70 Rosa Caroli, II Mito Dell'Omogeneita Giapponese : Storia Di Okinawa (Rome: Franco Angelini, 1999). 
p.203.
71 Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. Occupation, p.51. Rosa Caroli suggests that Ryukyu 
Islands became a 'terra senza status'.Caroli, II Mito Dell'Omogeneita Giapponese : Storia Di Okinawa. 
p.191.
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Nippon Times that the trusteeship of the Ryukyu was “under study”, but the trusteeship 
never was materialized.
The status of the Ryukyu population was, however, very clear for the American 
authorities in Okinawa. Even before the SFPT, in the Military Government Ordinance 
No 22 of 1950 when the Ryukyu Islands were divided in the four archipelagos (gunto) 
an inhabitant of the gunto was defined as the person who “has been born within the 
Ryukyu Islands and retained residence in the city, town or village within the gunto or 
who has come from without the Islands and established residence within the same with 
the intention of remaining permanently” granting them the right to move from one 
gunto to another (but not to migrate into or out of the Ryukyus). Later, during the 
establishment of the government of the Ryukyu Islands in the Civil Administration 
proclamation No. 13 of 1952, the Ryukyuans were stated to enjoy “basic liberties of 
democratic countries, including freedom of religion, speech, assembly, petition and 
press”.7' Therefore, for the local authorities the status of the Ryukyuan was defined by 
the place where they were born (a child of a Ryukyuan born overseas was thus not 
Ryukyuan) and they enjoyed basic liberties but not the right to move out of their 
country freely.77
72 Nippon Times, "Ryukyu Question Said under Study," April 22, 1952. For a brief profile of Ambassador 
Murphy see H.W. Brands, "The United States and the Reemergence of Independent Japan," Pacific 
Affairs 59, no. 3 (1986). P.393.
73 M.G. Ordinance 22, "The Law concerning the organization of the Gunto government" August 4, 1950. 
in United States Civil Administration:1950 - 1972, Laws and Regulations During the U.S. Administration 
o f Okinawa: 1945-1972, ed. Gekkan Okinawa sha, vol. Book 1 (n/d).
74 C.A. Proclamation No. 13 "Establishment of Government of the Ryukyu Islands" 1952, in Ibid.
75 In the case of identifying themselves, the fishermen had to identify their vessels with a special flag, 
consisting of the international Code Flag D, with an equilateral triangle cut from the fly. C.A. Ordinance 
No. 65, "Regulation of Ryukyu vessels" Feb. 27, 1952, in Ibid.
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Figure 1. Japan's Territory in an unofficial map of 1951.76
The ambiguity of the Ryukyus’ status is shown in Figure 1. This map was published 
in the front page of the Nippon Times in a special edition about the Peace Treaty in 
September 22, 1951. The Ryukyu Islands were left in the zone of Japan’s pre-war 
empire together with formers mandate islands and Taiwan. Therefore, Okinawa was not 
considered to be under Japan's sovereignty.
On the other hand, the fact that their international status was ambiguous (even 
before SFPT) produced some unusual situations and debates. There were a few 
questions that needed to be refered to the American legal process due to their 
complexity. For instance, in Cobb v. United States (1951), the appellant, a U.S. citizen 
employed by a contractor engaged in military construction had a car accident when he 
collided with an unlighted crane parked on the road after dark in Okinawa. The accident 
allegedly resulted from the negligence of an unknown employee of the U.S. in charge of
7h Nippon Times, "Peace Treaty Supplement," Sept. 25, 1951.
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that crane. The problem was whether or not Okinawa was considered to be a foreign 
country and whether the federal government could be sued for a tort that happened on 
Okinawa since it was under the U.S. control. In order to define the nature of Okinawa as 
a foreign state it was necessary first to clarify where its sovereignty lay. “The ultimate 
fate of Okinawa has not been decided. It cannot be said that the loss of ‘sovereignty’ 
over the island by Japan vests the ‘de jure sovereignty,’ in the traditional sense, in the 
natives of Okinawa” but since “the will of the U.S. is in fact the ‘supreme will’ on 
Okinawa. The United States has therefore acquired, and still retains, what may be 
termed a “de facto sovereignty.’” This case shows the legal complications of the 
situation of Okinawa even before the SFPT. In the end the judge needed to admit that 
the test of sovereignty when applied to the status of Okinawa, admits of no conclusive 
answer.77
However, since the article 3 of the SFPT was a slight adjustment of the ‘de facto’ 
situation in the Ryukyu Islands, the term Residual Sovereignity complicated more the 
definition of Okinawa’s international legal status. For example, in the 1954 case of the 
United States v. Ushi Shiroma, Ushi -an Okinawan born man living in the U.S.- was 
charged with failure as an alien to notify the Attorey General in writing of his current 
address as required by the law. Ushi Shiroma in his defense said that since he was a 
native Okinawa, and Okinawa was a possession of the U.S. he was not an alien but a 
national of the United States. The problem was again to define where the sovereignty 
of Okinawa resided, and in particular the practical aspects of residual sovereignty. The 
Court concluded that “Japan, and not the United States, having ‘de jure sovereignty’ 
over Okinawa since the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, the defendant is not a
77 Cobb v. United States in http://ftp.resource.Org/courts.gov/c/F2/191/191.F2d.604.12746 l.html 
visited on April 10, 2010.
78 The case's description can be found in Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 1 
(Department of State Publication 7403, 1963). pp 268 -  271.
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national of the United States”.79 In this sense, the residual sovereignty concept was 
explained by the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State in 1959 in this 
way: “This phrase [residual sovereignty] expresses the idea that, far from being a 
cession of sovereignty, Article 3 of the Peace Treaty contains provision only for the 
broad exercise of the rights and powers of sovereignty by the United States. Thus, the 
United States has not annexed the islands or claimed sovereignty over them; 
sovereignty remains in Japan -even though in a latent or residual form. But the right to 
exercise the rights and powers usually associated with sovereignty has been given to the 
United States”.80
In sum, the American occupation of Okinawa and the SFPT divided the sovereignty 
over the Ryukyu Islands and thus confused the way that the Okinawans saw themselves 
and how the American considered Okinawa.
1.3. Chapter Conclusions.
The study of the international position of the Ryukyu Islands sheds light on various 
issues, particularly on the geopolitical context in Northeast Asia. In this regard, the 
main conclusions to be drawn are:
The post-war situation of Okinawa remained unclear largely due to the vague 
wartime agreements that did not specify the status of the island as part of defeated Japan.
79 Ibid. P.269.
80 Ibid, p.270. Another example of how troublesome was the new status of Okinawa can be found in the 
concrete application of the Nationality law of Japan. Japan had changed after the war its nationality law, 
but since Okinawa had the same pre war laws, several irregular situations occurred. For example in the 
Ryukyu Island the foreign spouse of an Okinawan person was entitled to the Japanese citizenship but 
not in Japan, thus he/she was entitled to a false nationality. Also since in the new Nationality Law all 
nationals were required to have a domicile in Japan and the Ryukyu was not part of Japan according to 
the law (article 4 and 2(4)), a child born in the Ryukyu was not regarded as a child born in Japan. For a 
discussion on the issue see Saburo Kuwada, "Status of Okinawans under the Japanese Nationality Law," 
The Japanese Annual o f International Law, no. 3 (1959).
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This situation was used by the U.S. in its own benefits so that they could control the 
islands and built an American fortification in the Pacific.
In order to satisfy the demands of all interested parties, J.F. Dulles in the article 
3th of the SFPT authored a formula that used the U.N. Trusteeship System as bait for 
other nations so that the Peace Treaty could be signed and ratified without further 
discussion about the status of Okinawa. The resultant Residual Sovereignty concept 
created an even bigger confusion about the international legal status of Okinawa since 
the sovereignty over the island was divided.
Finally, as a vital piece of the U.S. chain of defense in the Pacific, Okinawa re­
attained its geopolitical importance in Asia. The ambiguous international status of the 
islanders can be seen as a strategy to perpetuate U.S. control over the islands and the 
first steps for more radical measures. In these conditions, the U.S. military could exert 
power in the Ryukyu Islands without responding either the Japanese government nor to 
the United Nations. Consequently, U.S. strategic priorities were above Okinawan 
people’s needs, and sometimes were carried damaging people’s lives.
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CHAPTER 2
Explaining Emigration in Cold War Okinawa.
In August 1954 the first group of Okinawan immigrants arrived in Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia. They were the first couple of hundred people to migrate in a scheme that in
o  1
almost ten years sent over three thousand people to Bolivia. The U.S. government,
through the Unites States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) and
other agencies, together with the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) and the
Bolivian government organized the selection process for migrating to Bolivia, funds to
cover the expenses of migration, free land in the hosting country, and so forth. The
purpose of this program was announced as a solution to the population problem in the
Ryukyu Islands; it aimed to send over ten thousand people to Bolivia, a small number if
compared to other migration movement that happened in the world by the same time but
82promoted as crucial to give Okinawans the opportunity of a better future.
The number of people who actually migrated to Bolivia fell short to what the 
USCAR authorities estimated necessary to face the serious population problem in the 
islands and also the destination chosen was less than an ideal prospect of opportunities 
to improve the social condition of the immigrants. Therefore, I consider necessary to 
look again and analyse the rationale behind the U.S. sponsored emigration of 
Okinawans to Bolivia.
81 Toshio Yanaguida and Marfa Dolores Rodriguez del Alisal, Japoneses En America (Madrid: Mapfre, 
1992). pp. 249-252.
82 The Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, supported by the U.S. 
government, had planned to send over 1,7 million European migrant to other continents (chiefly to the 
Americas and Oceania) in a five years plan.George L. Warren, "Problems of Financing European 
Migration," The Department o f State Bulletin XXXIII, no. 843 (1955). pp. 308-311.
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From a theoretical point of view, the Okinawan migration to Bolivia partially 
fits the patterns of labour/social migration. The difficult internal conditions in the 
stateless post-war Ryukyu Islands were characterized by a) the rapid increase of the 
population, b) the reduction of arable land, and c) lack of opportunities to prosper. 
These drove thousands of people to considerer migration as an alternative. Actually, 
Okinawa had a history of emigration, particularly since the Japanese annexation in 1879. 
Destinations included other parts of Asia, Micronesia and Latin America among others. 
However, during the first years of the American occupation (1945-1953), only those 
who were invited by their relatives already living in Latin America or elsewhere could 
apply to leave the islands. ' For the rest of the population, migration was initially not an 
option in occupied post-war Okinawa. Nonetheless, social and economic circumstances 
do not explain the whole process of postwar migration.
The complexity of the international position of the Ryukyu Islands within the 
context of increasing tension between the U.S. and the growing power of the USSR in 
the 1950s must be taken in account in order to explain the Okinawan migration to 
Bolivia. In this sense, the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) can be useful. The HST - 
developed by Charles Kindlebeger and Stephen Krasner among others- states basically 
that a hegemonic distribution of power (defined as one in which a single state has a 
predominance of power) is most conducive to the establishment of a stable, open
o z
international economic system. Consequently, the hegemon must perform certain
83 Robert K. Arakaki, "Theorizing on the Okinawa Diaspora," in Okinawa Diaspora, ed. Ronald Y.
Nakasone (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002). p. 31
84 Following the classic Ravenstein model of migration, the internal situation in Okinawa "pushed" 
people to migrate. See E. G. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration," Journal o f the Royal Statistical Society 
52, no. 2 (1889). and Felipe Cuamea, "Approaches to the Study of International Migration: A Review," in 
Estudios Fronterisos (2000)..
85 The called emigrants were only a few hundred people. For a general background of the early Okinawa 
Migration see Ronald Nakasone, "An Impossible Possibility," in Okinawan Diaspora, ed. Ronald 
Nakasone (Honolulu: University of Hawaii press, 2002)..
86 Webb and Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment."
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functions within this system such as take the lead in organizing trade liberalism, manage 
the international monetary system, supplying the international currency, and so forth. 
The United States was the hegemonic power after the World War II until the emergence 
of other economies such as Japanese, German or the Soviet in the 1960s and 1970s. As 
James F. Hollifield assessed, this particular theory of international relations can be
• . . .  q qapplied to explain migration. Hollifield states that the challenge for states in the post­
war period was to find a way to construct a new world order to promote their national 
interests that were tied closely to international trade and investment. Thus, the American
OQ
“hegemonic stability” solved the problem during the first two decades. For Hollifield, 
the liberal order was linked to the interest of the dominant power and following this 
reasoning, we could expect that certain rules governing the movement of people to 
reflect the interest of the dominant state.90 Even more, I argue that in the case of the 
Okinawan migration to Bolivia, the U.S. as hegemon used migration as a "security" 
policy to reduce possible social conflict, to protect their keystone of the liberal world's 
defence in the Pacific.91
In this chapter I will analyse both sides of the coin. First, the social elements that 
encourage people to migrate and also the U.S. interest in promoting migration. The 
migration movement to Bolivia was in first place the consequence of the pitiable
87 Ibid.
88 Hollifield, "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We "Bring the State Back In"?." pp.137- 
142..
89 In the liberal institutionalism trend of the international relations, the international political economy 
incorporates economic and political analysis.Ibid, p.155.
90 Hollifield, "Migration and International Relations: Cooperation and Control in the European 
Community."
91 Also it has been proved that there is a positive relation between migration and markets, thus the 
migration to Bolivia could help to increase the exchange of goods between both territories. However, it 
cannot be consider as part of the rationale for this specific movement since in the 1950s still there were 
not enough evidence about this relation. Gustavo Javier Canavire Bacarreza and Laura Ruud, "The 
Impact of Migration on Foreign Trade in Bolivia," in Migrants and Markets : Perspectives from  Economics 
and the Other Social Sciences, ed. Holger Kolb and Henrik Egbert, Imiscoe Research (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2008).
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conditions in the island and also, a measure promoted with the purpose of protecting the 
political stability of Okinawa (and thus the liberal world) and supporting a friendly 
American country.
2.1. Okinawan migration as labour Diaspora.
The years of the U.S. administration constitute a major chapter in the “tragedy of 
the Okinawan History” as Ota Masahide has named it. In this respect, the major 
consequence of Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Dulles’s residual 
sovereignty theory was that the U.S. government in the Ryukyu Island could exert the 
power in the ways that they consider necessary without responding to either the 
Japanese government nor to the United Nations. This had repercussions for the 
administration of civilians which were detrimental to the local population.93 The tragedy 
to which Ota refers was the worsening of the social, political and economical conditions 
of the Okinawa people; particularly overpopulation, lack of land, and poor 
administration.
The U.S. administration in Okinawa identified the rapid increase of the 
population as the most serious social problem in the islands. The population problem 
was already evident in the late 1940s, and in the 1950s it became even more serious 
(Table l ) 94
92 Koji Taira, "The Ota Testimony: Okinawa's Declaration of Independence?," The Ryukyuanist, no. 36 
(1997). p. 2
92 It was amply recognized by U.S. authorities that the U.S. position in the Ryukyu Islands had as its 
foremost objective to protect the security defence line in the Pacific. This objective was put over the 
proper administration of the territories and its inhabitants.Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the 
United States, 1949. pp.730-736
94 In June 1946 40% of the total population was between 1 and 15 years old (in the U.S. was 27% ) by 
November, over 95,000 people had been repatriated and the birth rate exponentially increased Daniel D. 
Karasik, "Okinawa a Problem in Administration and Reconstruction," The Far Easter Quarterly: Review o f 
Easter Asia and the adjacent Pacific Islands VII, no. 3 (1948). p.265
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Table 1. Land Area, Population, and Population Density, by gunto^
Land
Area
Population Population Per Square Mile
Square
Miles
1950 1955 1960 1950 1955 1960
Ryukyu
Islands
847.9 698,827 801,065 883,122 824 945 1,042
Okinawa
Gunto
544.4 580,223 678,017 759,341 1,066 1,245 1,395
(Okinawa
Island)
(454.0) (...) (614,060) (698,590) (...) (1,353) (1,539)
Miyako
Gunto
84.6 74,618 75,392 72,339 882 891 855
Yaeyama
Gunto
218.9 43,986 47,656 51,442 201 218 235
As population pressure increased rapidly in Okinawa the U.S. authorities, 
without considering other plausible alternatives, chose emigration as the best solution 
for the demographic problem. Major General J.R. Sheetz, the Militär Governor of the 
Ryukyu Islands in a letter dated 13 February 1950 estimated that the total population 
since the end of the war has increased as much as 40%. As he explained “This growth 
represents the combined effect of a natural increase, and of repatriation of Ryukyuan 
from Japan and other areas of the Pacific.96 In this period, a total of 172,688 persons 
have entered the islands, and only 9,196 persons have left the Ryukyus to go to other 
countries.” So he suggested in his letter emigration as solution for this problem “The 
most practical means of alleviating the effects of population pressure in the Ryukyu
95 USCAR, "The High Comissioner of the Ryukyu Islands: Facts Book," (San Francisco: 1965). p.5/13
96 For repatriation see Naval Military Government Directive # 109 of January 29th, 1946.1950 - 1972 
United States Civil Administration, Laws and Regulations During the U.S. Administration o f Okinawa: 
1945-1972, ed. Gekkan Okinawa Sha, vol. Book 3 (n/d). pp.191-193
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would be through large-scale emigration of Ryukyuans to other countries”. He also 
acknowledged that the decrease of arable land as a result of U.S. military base 
construction was part of the causes of the problem, however for the USCAR it was 
easier to reduce the population than to curtail the extension of the airfields. Although 
emigration was the natural response to overpopulation, the extent of the baby boom 
required other means to control the population. As author E.G. Seidensticker stated in 
1959 after a visit to the region: “In another few years the post war crop of babies will be 
flooding the labor market. Emigration cannot be relied upon to reduce the population, 
any more than it can in Japan”. 1 Indeed, the problem went far beyond the scope of any 
emigrational program. In Japan the overpopulation problem was approached not only by 
promoting emigration but also by modifying the Eugenic law in 1948 making abortion 
practically legal and promoting birth control methods. The USCAR government was 
reluctant to favour such approaches and abortion remained a criminal offense.99 
According to Tigner, due to the population pressure, by 1951 the young generation of 
Ryukyuans considered emigration to be of extreme importance to their future welfare.100 
In sum, the increase of population and slow U.S. reaction to the problem worsened the 
social situation in Okinawa.
97
97 Yoko Sellek, "Migration and Nation-State: Structural Explanations for Emigration from Okinawa," in 
Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity, ed. Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle (London:
Routledge Curzon, 2003). p.83
98 Seidensticker, "The View from Okinawa." p.42
99 In Japan the Eugenic Protection Law of 1948 and subsequent revisions made abortion practically legal 
and easy obtainable in Japan by 1952. It should be noted that in Japan only doctors could judge when an 
abortion was recommendable and by making an abortion they increased their revenues. Therefore, the 
medical groups played a main role in promoting abortion in the Parliament. In contrast, in Okinawa the 
medical group did not play a similar role in the shaping of the health policies. Takuma Terao, "Outline of 
Birth Control Movement in Japan with Some Remarks on the Controversial Points," (Japan National 
Commission for UNESCO, 1959). And also in: Kozy Amemiya, "Reinventing Population Problem in 
Okinawa: Emigration as a Tool of American Occupation," in JPRI Working Paper (JPRI: Japan Policy 
Research Institue at the USF Center for the Pacific Rim, 2002).
100 Tigner, "The Ryukyuans in Bolivia." p.219
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Certainly the worsening of the social situation in Okinawa was not due 
exclusively to the increase of population. The decrease of arable land was a source of 
poverty and political tension within the islands. It was a source of poverty since three 
fourths of all U.S. military bases in Japan are located in the Ryukyu Islands (covering 
around twenty percent of the territory) and thus, reducing the food supply in 
Okinawa.101 Prime Minister Kishi pointed this out in his visit to Washington: “The land 
problem is serious. The territory is small, and arable land is scarce. If land is taken for 
military use, even though payment is made, no other land can be obtained, because there 
is no other land”. " Land that otherwise could have been utilized for agriculture, it was 
designated for airfields, military buildings, and later for accommodation and recreation 
of the growing American population. It should be noted that process of land 
occupation was also a source of political tension and dispute. The land acquisition 
started during the war, and from 1950 it was conducted by the Service of the Army 
District Engineer, which had the power to purchase or lease property; since the price 
initially offered was too low the owners were reluctant to agree with the army’s
. 104terms.
In 1952, the recently formed GRI was made responsible for conducting the 
negotiations with the owners; however, the price offered was still below the owners’ 
expectations. By 1953 the U.S. authorities had taken a more authoritarian position
Hook and Siddle, "Introduction." p.4. The American appropriation of land in Okinawa has been amply 
researched. For a summary of the process see Miyume Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, ed. 
Glenn D. Hook, Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Series (London: Routledge, 2006). and 
Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa, p.41
102 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XXIII, (in two parts) Part 
1, Japan. (Washington, D.C.: Goverment Printing Office, 1991). p.372
103 Including civilians. See Donna Alvah, Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas 
and the Cold War, 1946-1965 (New York: New York University Press, 2007). pp.167-197
104 The price offered was the equivalent of thirty cans of Coca Cola for year.Tanji, Myth, Protest and 
Struggle in Okinawa, pp.60-64
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which was highlighted by lump-sum rental payments.105 In order to expand the U.S. 
military bases, the authorities forced the local population to rent their properties at a 
price set by the military.106 Families unwilling to rent their lands were forced by the U.S. 
soldiers to accept a lump-sum payment and leave their land. As an American 
Methodist missionary in Naha observed, the greatest problem was the lack of political 
sensibility from the U.S. authorities at the time of negotiating the price and re­
appraising the value of the land. Consequently, for him “(...) today we are losing the 
respect of the people”. The American reaction to the land problem came as a report 
from Congressman Melvin Price who after his visit to Okinawa in 1956 concluded that 
“Our primary mission in the islands is strategic and this mission in the last analysis, and 
the military necessity which flows from the mission, must take precedence”. He 
therefore supported the current payment system.100
Nevertheless, after massive demonstration against the U.S. and its policies in the 
archipelago, a new payment system was agreed upon and the prices were raised. To sum 
up, during the 1950s the land issue had significant social consequences that also help to 
explain the push for migration. Land acquisition for bases decreased the Okinawa’s 
capacity to produce its own food (making it more dependant of the U.S. aid), and also it 
was a source a political conflict between the land owners and the American authorities. 
Together with the growth of the population, the lack of land in a mostly agrarian society 
encouraged people to look outside Okinawa for a better future.
C.A. Ordinance 91, C.A. Ordinance 109.
106 Masterson and Funada-Classen, The Japanese in Latin America, p.138. Also in Hook and Siddle, 
"Introduction." pp.4-5.
107 Most of the time in order to start building a new base, US soldiers needed to accompany the 
bulldozers to small farms and take out the farmers and their families.Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in 
Okinawa, p.76.
108 Otis W. Bell, "Play Fair with Okinawa!," The Christian Century LXXI, no. 3 (1954). p.76
109 Helen Mears, "Our Blindspot in Asia," The Progressive 21, no. 7 (1957). p.16. By June 1956 Dulles 
considered the situation in terms of a group of farmers that did not want to lose their land, instead of 
the actual problem, a fair price for the lease. Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 
1955-1957. p.180
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A third element together with the population pressure and the land problem 
needs to be considered as a factor that propelled migration: the strong dissatisfaction 
towards the American administration. As Okinawan immigrants told Kozy Amemiya 
during her fieldtrip to Bolivia, they felt that in Okinawa they had been humiliated by the 
U.S. administration of the islands.110 Moreover, 10% of the immigrants cited their 
dislike of living under United States occupation as the primary reason for their decision 
to emigrate.* 111 The strong anti-American feeling reported amongst the local population 
was not due exclusively to issues of very difficult solution such as the increase of the 
population or the occupation of land for military purposes; rather, it was due to the poor 
performance of the U.S. civil administration in solving every-day problems and in 
acting with justice towards the population. Although U.S. propaganda promoted the 
idea that governors from the U.S. were better rulers than the pre-war Japanese 
prefectural authorities in terms of providing health and welfare services, supporting the 
Ryukyu farm families, and being able to change the face of “the Rock” with public 
works and reconstruction, the reality suggests many problems in the administration of 
the U.S. occupied Okinawa during the 1950s.
Briefly, the U.S. administration -  which never had a consolidated power
1 1 Tstructure until the end of the 1950s - conducted the reconstruction process of the
Kozy Amemiya, "The Bolivian Conection: U.S. Bases and Okinawa Emigration," in Okinawa: Cold War
Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999).
111 Nakayama et al. 1986, cited in Taku Suzuki, Embodying Belonging: Racializing Okinawa Diaspora in 
Bolivia and Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2010). p.30.
112 For positive opinions about the work of the U.S. troops in Okinawa see The United States Civil 
Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, The Ryukyu Islands: Prewar and Postwar (through 30 June 1958) 
(n/d). p.9; Maj. Gen. David A.D. Ogden, "Keystone of the Pacific," Army Informative 9, no. 1 (1954). p.47; 
and Gladys Zabilka, Customs and Culture o f Okinawa (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1968 (1959)). 
p.16. For a study about Okinawa including the causes of Anti-American feelings see Conlon Associates 
Ltd., United States Foreign Policy: Asia/Studies Prepared at the Reguest o f the Committee on Foreign 
Relations United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959)..
113 The power structure suffered many changes particularly in the 1940s with shifts from the Army to the 
Navy and then to the Army again, and in the 1950s, when in 1950s the U.S. military government was 
replaced by the USCAR with its head in Tokyo (Commander-in-Chief, Far East as Governor, and the
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civilian sections of the islands very slowly, had in general a very poor economic 
performance, as well as being undemocratic and having a poor human rights record.114 
The reconstruction of the island ( a task entrusted to the “Public Service” office and 
after 1957 of the “Public Works” office) hardly advanced at all during the 1940s and 
only with the foundation of the USCAR (1950) and the increase of funds the 
reconstruction of the major cities and housing developments firmly started.11'^  Naha was 
designed to be the capital city of the Ryukyu; however, between 1956 and 1959 in 
protest at the election of a pro-communist major in Naha, financial support to the city 
was cut off. Fourteen years after the end of the war the capital city was still under 
reconstruction.116 Moreover, in the economic sphere, the Ryukyu Islands did not 
perform well at all. Even though according to the U.S. sources there was almost no 
unemployment in the territory, (see Table 2) the country was submerged in poverty. By 
1959, as Steve Rabson notes, the difference between Okinawa and the rest of Japan 
were strikingly noticeable: on one hand a buoyant mainland economy and on the other
• • 1 1 o
Okinawa was left in deep poverty. Furthermore, as USCAR's own statistical 
documents observed, by the end of the 1950s the diet of children was very poor in
Commanding General, Ryukyu Command as Deputy Governor) and a "Civil Administrator" in Okinawa. In 
1952, with the enforcement of the SFPT, Okinawa was no more an enemy territory so the locals could 
elect their own representatives in the new created GRI, which head was still appointed by the 
authorities in Tokyo. Later, the position of Deputy Governor changed its name in 1957 to High 
Commissioner (an aesthetic change only) and from 1962, the Civil Administrator began to be a civilian 
official.(Higa p23-24)
114 A complete analysis of the U.S. administration of the Ryukyu can be found in Yoshida, Democracy 
Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. Occupation, and Aurelia George Mulgan, "Managing the U.S. Base Issue in 
Okinawa: A Test," Working paper N° 2000/1 (Canberra: Working paper N° 2000/1, 2000).
115 By 1959 128,000 houses were constructed financed mainly with U.S. funds. Mansel G. Blackford, 
Pathways to the Present: Us Development and Its Consequences in the Pacific (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2007). p.161.
116 Ikeda Takayuki, "War Damage Reconstruction, City Planning and U.S. Civil Administration in 
Okinawa," in Rebuilding Urban Japan after 1945, ed. Carola Hein, Jeffry M. Diefendorf, and Ishida 
Yorifusa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). pp.131-144
117 Historically the Ryukyu Islands have been an economic burden for their colonisers, since the 
resources in the islands are limited and trade hindered.
118 Steve Rabson, "Memories of Okinawa: Life and Times in the Greater Osaka Diaspora," in Islands o f 
Discontent: Okinawa Response to Japanese and American Power, ed. Laura Hein and Mark Seiden 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, inc., 2003). p.104
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Calcium (only 25% of the daily diet requirement), Vitamin A and B. Even more, in 
Miyako, people were reported eating poisonous plants as their last means to avoid 
starvation.1 19 Monetary policy was erratic during the 1940s and 1950s and generated 
inflation.120 Okinawa had three different currencies within eleven years: from the 
Japanese yen the U.S. authorities shifted to the Type B military Yen and later on to 
avoid a further depreciation of the military currency this was replaced by the U.S dollar 
in 1958 (see Table 3). The trade balance exemplifies the situation in Okinawa: in
1959 they exported over twenty million dollars worth of goods but imported one
122hundred and twelve million. "
1 9 9Table 2. Labor Force Status of population by Period, Ryukyu Islands.
1 Dec 1950 1 Dec 1955 1 Dec 1957
Total Population 698.827 801,065 830,400
Labor Force 290,792 333,800 368,900
Employed 289,572 329,100 364,200
% of the Labor 0.4 1.4 1.3
Force unemployed
United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, "Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands," 
ed. Office of Plans and Programs (1960). p.191
120 To stop inflation the USCAR government established price control on main products. For price control 
documents see 1950 - 1972 United States Civil Administration, Laws and Regulations During the U.S. 
Administration o f Okinawa: 1945-1972., ed. Gekkan Okinawa Sha, vol. Book 4 (n/d).
121 It is important to note that whereas in mainland Japan the SCAP tried to increase the exports by 
devaluating the Yen, in Okinawa the Type B Military Yen was more expensive than the yen in order to 
benefit the Japanese and American producers. Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. 
Occupation, p.90
122 United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, "Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands." 
P-5
123 The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, The Ryukyu Islands: Prewar and Postwar 
(through 30 June 1958).
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Table 3. Official Exchange Rate. 124
Period Ryukyuan Legal Tender Rate of Exchange per U.S. 
dollar.
1937-1946 (average) Japanese Yen Y. 3.4
April 1945- August 1947 Japanese Yen Y. 10
Sep. 1945 -February 1947 Japanese Yen Y. 15
March 1947 -April 1950 Type B Military Yen YB 50
April 1950- September 
1958
Type B Military Yen YB 120
September 1958-1964 U.S. Dollars Not applicable
In terms of labour rights, the U.S. administration did not do better. First there 
were huge difference in salary between American employees, Japanese employees and 
Filipino employees, with the local population being the cheapest labour. Local 
employees working for the U.S. did not have the right to collective bargaining; and 
there was no minimum wage. Finally, the failure of the U.S. government to address 
the people's necessities and to give them a fair treatment was worsened by the vision 
from some sectors within the U.S. officials that the Okinawans were backward. As 
general Hull mentioned to President Eisenhower, “the people of the Ryukyu not only
• • 1 2 7did not understand democracy but were incompetent to run their own affairs”. The 
vision of Okinawan as something lower than the American was also spread by the 
“unofficial ambassadors” of the U.S., the service wives who considered the Okinawans
124 USCAR, "The High Comissioner of the Ryukyu Islands: Facts Book." p.11/2
125 The U.S. worked earned twelve times more than what Okinawan people made.Tanji, Myth, Protest 
and Struggle in Okinawa, p.78
126 C.A. Ordinance #144, 1955. Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. Occupation, pp.92-93. 
Also it was mandatory to obtain permission from USCAR to form unions and obtain recognition for the 
union executive. (USCAR Ordinance 145.). For the absence of minimum wage The High Commisioner of 
the Ryukyu Islands, "Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands," (1960). p.166
127 Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1952-1954, vol. 14,(in two parts) Part 2 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985). p.1608
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• 198as children and treated them as such. " In sum, the poor and undemocratic performance 
of the civil administrator of the Ryukyu Islands let the Okinawan people’s frustration to 
grow, frustration that at the end of the day also propelled migration.
In conclusion, “the tragedy” of the Ryukyu Island represented in these three 
aspects -land, population and administration- affected the whole population and 
impoverished the lives of those repatriated after the war. It also meant the humiliation of 
the total of the population and what it was worse, since their international status was 
ambiguous, there was no hope of an improvement of the situation in the foreseeable 
future. The natural consequences of all these factors were poverty, frustration and 
resentment, elements that were depicted as the major reasons to emigrate by the
129
Okinawan immigrants in Bolivia.
2.2. The U.S. rationale for promoting migration.
After World War II, the U.S. used its strategic position in strategic terms, to 
maintain and protect a line of defence for the liberal order in the Pacific. Although in 
the 1940s and 1950s there was as yet no co-hegemonic nation in Asia, communism was 
seen as the ultimate threat for the economic international order. In this environment the 
Ryukyu Islands were christened as the “Keystone” of the liberal order’s defence line in 
the Pacific. As Dean Acheson stated that Okinawa was part of a defensive perimeter 
which ran along the Aleutians to Japan and then went to the Ryukyu, Taiwan and the 
Philippines. The strategic position of the Ryukyu and the immense military
128 Alvah, Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946-1965. 
p.168
129 Amemiya, "The Bolivian Conection: U.S. Bases and Okinawa Emigration."
130 Acheson, "Crisis in Asia -an Examination of the U.S. Policy." pp.111-118. Also Secretary Dulles 
asserted before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council: "Today, the vast Pacific is a friendly ocean only 
because the West Pacific islands and two peninsular positions are in friendly hands. Thus, the United 
States itself holds Okinawa, Guam and other islands." John Foster Dulles, "Security in Teh Pacific," The 
Department o f State Bulletin XXX, no. 783 (1954).
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investment that the U.S. had made, transformed Okinawa into the main link in the chain 
of the Pacific defence. I will argue that the rationale behind the promotion of emigration 
to Bolivia or elsewhere was to protect general U.S. interest in the Ryukyu Islands.
In January 1957, Secretary of State Dulles explained to his counterpart in 
Defense, Charles E. Wilson, the danger of a politically instable Okinawa for the U.S. 
plans in the region:
“It is evident, of course, that a favourable local climate is essential to achieve 
United States objectives in the Ryukyus since hostility of the local population would 
largely negate the utility of military bases.(...) [I am] convinced that we have entered a 
new stage in the administration of the Ryukyu Islands where it is necessary to make 
modifications or else incur a growing hostility that may endanger our diplomatic and 
military position in the Far East”131
In other words, the role of Okinawa for the global plan of the United States was 
so important that they could not afford a major social uprising in the island. In this 
section I will analyse the nature of the relationship between Okinawans and Americans 
so as to draw a clearer picture of the threat for the diplomatic and military U.S.’ position 
in the Ryukyu Islands.
2.2.1. Political stability and Communism in Okinawa.
The position of the United States in Okinawa was, from the earliest years of the 
occupation, opposed by most sectors of the population including leftists and pro­
communist groups. Among the reasons for rejecting the USCAR we can mention the 
paradox of training people for democracy while at the same time maintaining them 
under a tight foreign military rule, the poor performance as administrators and on the
^Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. pp.244-245
48
top of that, the fact that the islands were severed indefinitely from Japan leaving 
Okinawa in an ambiguous international position. “ Therefore the U.S. position in 
Okinawa was perceived by the U.S. authorities to be threatened by political and social 
forces within the Ryukyu Islands.
In first place, political parties, landowners, the School Teachers Union and 
workers participated in anti-American and reversion movement rallies. Political 
parties provided a political platform for civilian and social leaders to express their 
dissatisfaction towards the occupation. As early as 1949 the main political parties in 
Okinawa formed a “Popular Front’ to oppose the military government economic policy, 
and for the 1952 legislative election all parties had in their platform the goal of
t 134reversion to Japan.
In fact, the American authorities recognized that an increase of social tension in 
Okinawa could give an opportunity to left wing political parties to obtain extra votes not 
only in Okinawa but in Japan proper as well. For instance, after Melvin Price’s report 
(which recommended lump-sums payment against the landowners’ wishes) was made 
public, the socialists gained more popular support in all the country making them to 
perform well in the July’s election. 135 Kono Ichiro, a senior Japanese official, 
complained to Ambassador Allison about the publication of the Price report. The^ 
problems generated by the report required the Department of State to make an
132 All these elements were also the basis for the Reversion Movement, which had as its objective the 
return of Okinawa to Japanese administration.
133 According to Miyume Tanji the school teachers union was a central force that led the campaign for 
reversion. Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, p.56
134 The main parties by 1952 were the Okinawan People's Part (Okinawa Jiminto) led by pro-communist 
Senaga Kamejiro; the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (Okinawa Shakai Taishuto); Ryukyu Democratic 
Party (Ryukyu Minshuto). Initially some political parties celebrated the independence from Japan, 
however from 1952 on all political sectors concurred with the goal of reversion. Higa, Politics and Parties 
in Postwar Okinawa, p.29, 31 Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, pp.55-56
135 Kono Ichiro, a high Japanese official, complained to Allison about making public the Price's report 
since for him it was the main cause of the socialist performance. Department of State, Foreign Relations 
o f the United States, 1955-1957. p.190-192
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• • 1 3 6announcement and reject claims of U.S. expansionism. The U.S. authorities, 
particularly in the Department of State, were very concerned with the political 
consequences of any misstep in Okinawa, to the point of recommending not to 
introduce the dollar currency in the Ryukyu (which had clear economic benefits and 
advantages from an administrative viewpoint) to avoid further conflict with the political 
and social movements. ‘ From this perspective Kozy Amemiya’s presumption that the 
USCAR encouraged migrations to Bolivia before the end of the base construction plan
138in 1955 so to avoid massive popular unemployment turmoil is plausible.
Together with the political parties, landowners, workers and school teacher 
unions, other social actors in Okinawa and abroad opposed the U.S. role in the Ryukyu 
Islands. In Okinawa, students and intellectuals also resisted the American rule through 
what Michael Molasky has called “Occupation Literature”, a genre that participated in 
both the construction and preservation of the society memory of the era. Authors like 
Oshiro Tatsuhiro and Arakawa Akira in a context of severe restrictions on the 
publication of material, opposed the U.S rule.140 Amongst the university students there 
were leftist groups that actively opposed the U.S. administration of the Ryukyus. For 
instance in 1953, the American authorities denounced university students who produced 
a pamphlet called “Liberty” which according to Gen. James M. Lewis, Civil
136 Ibid. pp.182-183
137 In this particular case, the main issue was not to provide ammunition to the Socialist and Communist. 
Ibid, p.436
130 Amemiya, "Reinventing Population Problem in Okinawa: Emigration as a Tool of American 
Occupation."
139 Michael S. Molasky, The American Occupation o f Japan and Okinawa: Literature and Memory 
(London: Routledge, 1999). p.2
140 For example Arakawa Akira poem of 1956 "the Colored Race" accused the ethnical discrimination 
towards the Okinawa population.Ibid, p.94 Cf. Davinder L. Bhowmik, Writing Okinawa: Narrative Acts of 
Identity and Resistance, ed. Mark Seiden, Routledge Studies in Asia'S Transformation (New York: 
Routledge, 2008). pp.89-123
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Administrator, “contains some of the most vitriolic and vituperative anti-American 
propaganda known to have been printed in the Ryukyus” . 141
In addition, religious authorities (including western Christians) played an 
important role in denouncing the unfairness committed by the USCAR authorities to the 
local population. Similarly, the religious authorities helped to create the image of 
Okinawa as an American colony. 142 Some of them published their criticism of American 
governance in American journals or magazines. The press in the U.S. was from early 
time reporting about the deficiency in the U.S. administration in the Ryukyu. 
Publications such as the Christian Century, The Progressive, Harper’s Magazine, Life, 
Times and the New York Times reported about situation in Okinawa. Despite the 
differences, all of them at one moment or another provided a platform of criticism 
towards the U.S. administration in the islands. 143 For example, in numerous columns 
Robert Trumbull of the New York Times expressed strong criticism towards the lack of 
experience of the USCAR authorities and even more, criticised the U.S. failure to create 
a potential American showcase of democracy. 144
Moreover, in a U.S. Senate requested report which was widely disseminated 
amongst pro-reversion groups, Robert A. Scalapino suggested that “the only realistic 
policy is that of accepting the fact of the gradual and ultimate reversion of Okinawa to 
Japan, and developing plans now to take account of the timing and adjustment needed to
141 The case of the "Liberty" ended with four students expelled. "Report of Government and Political 
Developments -  May 1953" Jun 4, 1953. NA RG.260.B190.2/l.ex.2169.FRCs603. Folder 14.1.
142 William W. Hunt III, Christian, Buddhist and Confucian Protests against Military Bases in Okinawa: A 
Study o f Seven Religious Leaders (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008). pp.61-76
143 Time, "Okinawa: Unskilled Labor," in Time.com (1958).; Mears, "Our Blindspot in Asia."; Bell, "Play 
Fair with Okinawa!."; Barton M. Biggs, "The Outraged Okinawans " Harper's Magazine 1958.
144 Robert Trumbull, "Okinawa: "Sometimes Painful" Lesson for Us," New York Times, April 7 1957.
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insure long-range American interest” . 14:1 In Washington, the authorities realized the 
threat that an internationalization of the American failure could mean. As John Foster 
Dulles, referring to the impact of the Price Report and potential support for the 
“reversion cause” from the USSR or other Asian countries could have in the 
international arena, stated: “the spectacle of Communist or Asian agitation and support 
for an international inquiry into the ‘colonial' administration of the islands must be 
viewed as a definite likelihood” . 146 In sum, the criticism expressed by intellectuals, 
religious leaders and American journalists was also considered a problem since it 
promoted the image of Okinawa as an American colony where American democracy 
had failed.
Finally, the ultimate menace for the U.S. global interest deposited in Okinawa, 
was the gradually penetration of left wing groups in the islands. Marxism and 
Communism were the main contestants to U.S. hegemonic liberal power in the Pacific 
and they were recognised as such. However, the Americans were not afraid that pro­
communist agents could take over Okinawa by force (something unthinkable 
considering the U.S. military strength on the island). Political means were another 
matter. As Everett Drumright of the State Department noticed “(...) the Communists 
have acquired considerable proficiency in gaining their ends by political methods” . 147 
The lack of political stability in the Ryukyu Islands could, according to U.S. authorities, 
lead to communism and revolt against the Americans.14x As James L. Tigner (advisor of 
the USCAR) and Paul H. Skuse, Chief of the Public Safety Division of the USCAR
145 This report was one of four requested by the Senate and the only one that suggested reversion. See 
Conlon Associates Ltd., United States Foreign Policy: Asia/Studies Prepared at the Request o f the 
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, p . l l
146 Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1955-1957. p.245
147 Everett Drumright, "Problems in the Far East," The Department o f State Bulletin XXXI, no. 799 (1954). 
p.572. For the State Department position towards the Communist threat in the Far East see Howard J. 
Jones, "United States Policy in the Far East," The Department o f State Bulletin XXXVII, no. 961 (1957). 
pp.840-845.
148 Sellek, "Migration and Nation-State: Structural Explanations for Emigration from Okinawa." p.83
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(branch in charge of immigration) concluded in their report about the situation in the 
Ryukyu Islands:
“The Okinawan people are traditionally farmers and ownership of the land is one 
of their most cherished desires in life. Okinawa, with its rising population and 
decreasing areas of available land, will offer progressively less future for the farming 
population. Restiveness and dissatisfaction will inevitably accompany the waning 
prospects of land ownership and fading hopes for an adequate livelihood, particularly 
among the youth of Okinawa. Since Communists appeal to the youth of a nation, and 
with apparent success in many areas of the Communist-dominated world, the youth of 
Okinawa represents a potentially vulnerable element of the population” . 149
The communist threat was perceived as something that could at any moment 
complicate the U.S. position in the Ryukyu. From the establishment of the Government 
of the Ryukyu Islands and the establishment of independent legislative, executive and 
judicial organs, the political activity in the islands increased.IM) This made it possible 
that left wings parties such as the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party and particularly the 
Okinawa People’s Party (OPP) could lead the opposition to the United States. Although 
the OPP, led by Senaga Kemejiro, was accused on many occasions by the U.S. military 
authorities of being a communist party, Senaga was prompt to deny it. However, 
according to the intelligence reports, in the rallies organised by the OPP “a morale boost 
was given by the singing of such songs as the “Internationale”, “Hear, You Workers of 
All Nations”, “Song for Guarding World Peace” (...)” songs identified with the
"Memorandum: Ryukyu Emigration -  South America" September 20, 1952. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 
box30. I will develop Tigner's role in the Ryukyuan Emigration Program in chapter 3.
150 Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa, pp.27-31. Also see "Political Parties", M.G. Special 
Proclamation N° 23, October 5, 1947.
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communist tradition. 1^ 1 Also, the role of the OPP and Senaga needs to be understood 
within the syllogism of the Cold War: to act like a communist was to be a communist, 
and to be a communist was to be an instrument of international Soviet aggression. In 
this regard, it was not a surprise that a few years later the USCAR needed to change by 
decree the democratic rules governing municipal elections in order to dismiss Senaga as 
Naha’s Mayor. The U.S. authority felt threatened enough by the possibility that a 
leftist could have a position of power to blatantly go against the democratic values that 
they professed.
Figure 2. Senaga Kamejiro. I>3
Summing up, the role of the United States in Okinawa was strongly opposed by 
different social and political groups in the islands and in the United States. The U.S. 
authorities believed that a lack of political stability could endanger the strategic position 
of American’s “Keystone in the Pacific”. This could be utilized by leftist groups to 
further compromise the fragile American political position in the island. Consequently, 
social conflict in the island, as seen in Washington, could compromise the effectiveness
151 "Report of Government and Political Developments -  May 1953" Jun 4, 1953. NA 
RG.260.B190.2/l.ex.2169.FRCs603. Folder 14.1.
152 Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, p.82.
153 Trumbull, "Okinawa: "Sometimes Painful" Lesson for Us."
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of the strategic role of Okinawa in the Pacific chain of defence. Thus, within this socio­
political context is where we need to understand policies such as promotion of 
emigration.
2.2.2. The U.S. security policies to reduce social conflict.
The United States after the SFPT needed to deal with both the wish of the 
mainland Japanese to recover Okinawa and the protests of the civilian population in the 
Ryukyu. These problems were closely connected: what happened in Okinawa had a 
strong impact in mainland Japan in terms of news coverage and political 
consequences.1^4 The reversion movement in Okinawa was the focus that gathered and 
expressed the frustration and anxiety of the Okinawan people in relation to the lack of 
opportunities in the islands and the authoritarian rule of the foreign occupation troops. 
On the other hand, the Japanese government, tied by the post-war treaties, tried feebly 
to change the situation in the Ryukyu Islands during the 1950s.155 As Prime Minister 
Kishi said during his visit to Washington in 1957: ‘The problems of Okinawa are not 
simply those 800,000 Okinawans, but of 90,000,000 Japanese”.1^6
Nevertheless, the strategic position of Okinawa expressed in the NSC 13/3 and 
repeated in other official documents made extremely difficult for the American 
authorities to give any kind of concession about the sovereignty of the islands and the 
military role in the governance of the Okinawa.157 Okinawa was the “Keystone” of the 
defence line in the Pacific, a strategic piece in the puzzle of American hegemony. 
However this position was not free of criticism within the U.S. Government. In
154 For the political impact see supra section 2.1.
155 During the 1950s the Japanese government also tried to sign a peace treaty with the USSR and 
increase economic relations with the People's Republic of China. The U.S. vetoed a Japanese treaty with 
the USSR and strongly discouraged relations with Communist China.
156 Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1955-1957. pp.369-375
157 Supra Chapter 1.
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particular, the State Department recommended returning the Ryukyu Islands to Japan so 
as to avoid political criticism from Japan and elsewhere.1^  This posture was completely 
discarded in the State-Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) meeting in April 1952 when 
Ambassador Sebald, Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Murphy discussed the issue 
with the JCS. In that discussion the reasons for not releasing the Ryukyu from U.S. 
control were revealed when the in the JCS Gen. Vandenberg stated:
“(...) if we are going to wage atomic war, which might be unpopular with the Japanese, 
we would have to have a free hand. If we didn’t have a free hand we would lose 90 per 
cent of the value of the base”.l ?9
So the position of the U.S. in the Ryukyu was at least during the 1950s 
unchangeable in terms of absolute control of the population in the base hosting islands. 
In case of war the U.S. military authorities considered it important to have absolute 
control over the land and the population. The military needed (as Gen. Vandenberg 
argued) a “free hand”. However there were still the problems of dealing with the 
Japanese government and the local population. In this regard, the approach of the U.S. 
was less to find a conclusive solution to problems but to patch them according to the 
situation. Migration, control of political parties and territorial concessions to the 
Japanese government were all policies meant to deal with the problem of the U.S. 
occupation of Okinawa.
In response to the Japanese government's demands of sovereignty, the U.S. 
authorities decided during the Eisenhower administration to return the Amami island 
group (to the north of the Ryukyu archipelago) by the end of 1953.160 This was a
158 Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1952-1954. pp.1116-1120; p.1184
159 Ibid. pp.1224-1227.
160 The Amami islands had been part of Kagoshima prefecture before the war; however, as part of the 
Ryukyu islands it was incorporated in the Art. 3 of the SFT.
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political move to reduce tension with Japan and avoid further discussion about Okinawa. 
By returning the Amami group the U.S. did not lose much of its strategic position in the 
Pacific since most of the bases were located in the southern part of the Ryukyu Islands. 
As president Eisenhower mentioned himself, “To insist on controlling this little group 
of islands, which obviously meant a lot to Japan, amounted to risking the loss of our 
main objective, which was to assure ourselves of Japan’s friendship and loyalty over the 
long run”.161 The “Christmas present” -as it was dubbed- was also the token in exchange 
for the Japanese silence about the U.S. control of Okinawa. The American authorities 
expected that after the return of the Amami the Japanese will not press for the return of 
control over Okinawa and the Bonin for a long time. “ Finally, when the issue of the 
reversion of Okinawa to Japan was again raised in high level talks during the Kishi visit 
in 1957, the American once again rejected the idea. The U.S. could not renounce more 
strategic territory and fulfil at the same time their security duties.
The relationship between the U.S. officials and the population of the Ryukyu 
Islands was completely different to the one with the Japanese authorities. The reversion 
movement was not one that would allow gifts in exchange of peace, the local population 
demanded complete return of sovereignty to the Japanese. As the reversion movement, 
including the landowners and other social actors grew stronger, creating great social 
conflict and fanning strong anti-American feelings; the USCAR authorities saw a major 
influence of pro-communist elements and thus a threat to the control of the islands. In 
order to reduce social conflict in the Ryukyu Islands the U.S. authorities took a series of 
measures. Among them, the reversion movement and the Okinawa People’s Party were 
targeted from the early years of the decade and their leaders ended up spending time in
161 In the NSC meeting of June 25, 1953. Quoted in Robert D. Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands: 
The Reversion Movement and U.S. - Japan Relations, ed. Edward R. Beauchamp, Studies of Modern 
Japan (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004). p.97
162 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. pp.1481-1484
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1AT • . . . . .prison. Also, in order to lower the participation in rallies or protests against U.S. 
politics in the islands, the American authorities organized events such as band concerts, 
drill teams and tank exhibits a few hundred metres from the demonstration site.164 In 
addition, it was customary that the employees of military installations could lose their 
jobs if seen in such demonstrations.16^ The USCAR government tried to hinder all 
suspects of communism from running for elections. However, in the case that one leftist 
successfully attained a chief post in a municipality, the U.S: authorities went to the 
extreme of changing the rules to take him out of office (as happened in the case of 
Senaga in 19 5 7).166 Also, the USCAR government tried through emigration to sooth 
social tensions.
I would like to observe at this point that the rationale behind organizing and 
promoting migration was first and foremost utilitarian. In 1952 when early projects of 
migration were discussed, two were the common conclusions reached: first, Okinawa 
was suffering from population pressure and emigration would relieve this problem and 
lessen the U.S. government’s economic support to the Okinawa population; and second, 
through emigration, the U.S. authorities could preserve the political stability in the 
islands and particularly, reduce anti-U.S. sentiments among the youth. In the 
blueprint of the emigrational program, James Tigner stressed that “an emigrational 
program will give fresh hope to the youth and in this way serve to cope with their 
discontent and susceptibility to the communist’s false promise of reward”. In this
163 Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. Occupation, p.59
164 These activities were organized for instance in the May Day of 1953. See “Report of Government and 
Political Developments -  May 1953" Jun 4, 1953. NA RG.260.B190.2/l.ex.2169.FRCs603. Folder 14.1.
1 6 5  IL'JIbid.
166 Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1955-1957. pp.544-546
167 "Completion of SIRI Study of Ryukyuan Emigration Problem and Latin American Opportunities" 
November 15, 1952. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30. Also in "Memorandum: Ryukyu Emigration -  South 
America" September 20, 1952. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
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sense, the emigration program cannot be considered to be only the solution to a 
demographic/economic problem but also a policy oriented to solve a political problem.
In the context of increasing anxiety in rulers and subjects (the former for 
reducing social tension and the latter for attaining a better life), the emigration plan was 
strongly supported in the U.S. as in Okinawa. After all, Okinawa was a country of 
immigrants where after the war around two hundred thousand people were repatriated 
from mainland Japan and other parts of the former Japanese empire. Also, the idea of 
promoting emigration was in line with the approach taken by the Japanese Authorities 
to deal with their own demographic problems so it would not have represented a 
diplomatic issue with the Japanese.169 In the United States the idea received strong 
support from the congress, particularly by the work of Walter Judd, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific. Senator Judd -a  former medical 
missionary in China and a supporter of McCarthyism-171 considered migration a means 
to solve the problems related with overpopulation and the anti-American propaganda in 
the Ryukyus, America’s “No 1 base out there”. He first introduced a bill (H.R. 
10194) to provide an immigration quota for Okinawans to enter the U.S. Also, Judd 
helped to include in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, an item securing US$800,000 for 
funding the Ryukyuan Emigration Programs. 174 Finally, the idea was favourably 
received by the Okinawans. Due to the conditions that propelled migration discussed
Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1952-1954. p.1785
170 According to some authors, W. Judd played a leading role in shaping the foreign policy in the decade 
of 1950s. Lee Edwards, Missionary o f Freedom: The Life and Times o f Walter Judd (New York: Paragon 
House, 1990). p.203. For a political profile of the career of Walter H. Judd see Barbara Stühier, Ten Men 
o f Minnesota and American Foreign Policy, 1898 -1968  (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 
1973). pp.169-193.
171 Judd supported the purge of leftists from the Department of State, although he did not supported 
the means used by Senator McCarthy. See Edwards, Missionary o f Freedom: The Life and Times o f 
Walter Judd.
172 Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, Mutual Security Act o f 1956, 84th Congress, 1956. p.312.
173 The minimum quota was set in one hundred. "House of Representatives Bill 10194" August 9, 1954. 
NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
174 "Letter from Walter H. Judd to John A. Swezey" August 19, 1954. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
59
above, the Okinawan people embraced the idea of migrate as a solution to the 
difficulties found in the islands; thus, by the end of the decade, emigration was included 
in the political platform of some parties. For instance, the Okinawa Liberal Democratic 
Party in its political platform article “F”, defended a “vigorous promotion of the 
emigration program”; similarly, the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party also defended the 
promotion of emigration in its platform.17^ Moreover, the GRI's Chief Executive Higa 
advocated migration not only to Latin America but also to the South Sea Islands, from
1 n  £
where many Okinawan had been repatriated after the war.
On this basis, in 1953 the US administration introduced a policy offering 
assistance to emigrants from the Ryukyus to Bolivia. The scheme attracted enormous 
interest in Okinawa. The first emigration ship left from the port of Naha in June 1954. 
By the end of that year over four hundred people had emigrated from the Ryukyus to 
Bolivia. The scheme continued until 1967 and included other destinations such as Brazil,
1 77the U.S., and Argentina sending in total 15475 people.
2.3. Chapter Conclusions
This chapter argues that the Okinawa emigration program to Bolivia was un part 
a consequence of internal social/labour conditions that propelled people to leave their 
motherland. Nevertheless, such movement could have never been materialized unless 
the American authorities agreed to organize and promote it. In that sense, the U.S. 
policy on migration reflected the importance of Okinawa as keystone of the American 
defence in the Pacific and the role of the U.S. as guardian of the liberal world's interests.
175 The High Commisioner of the Ryukyu Islands, "Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands." pp. 315- 
320
176 "Petition for Emigration to the South Sea Islands of the Ryukyu Fishermen" March 17, 1953. NA 
RG.260.B190.2/l.ex.2169.FRCs603. Folder 14.1.
177 Source in JICA, Okinawaken to kaigai ijuu (Tokyo: Jica 1982) pp, 98 -  99. Cited in Toake Endoh, 
Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration toward Latin America (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 2009). p.164.
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Overpopulation, the reversion movement, the growth of leftist groups and other anti- 
U.S. movements were considered a very serious threat to U.S. interests in the region so 
the American authorities acted by promoting various policies and among them, 
emigration.
Consequently, emigration was first thought of as a policy to improve security 
rather than a means for improving people's life. To understand the process that turned 
this aim into reality, however, we need to consider in detail how the migration scheme 
was initiated. This also involves an examination of the reasons why Bolivia was chosen 
as the destination for migration. What kind of connections made possible to link Bolivia 
and Okinawa. How was the choice of Bolivia as hosting country and the process of 
assisting the creation of the emigrant colonies in Latin America connected to U.S. 
policy. To understand this, we also need to examine role played the emigrants 
themselves in the global U.S. strategy.
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CHAPTER 3
The Bolivian Connection
In June 10, 1953, the president of Bolivia Victor Paz Estenssoro signed the 
Supreme Resolution N. 5731 1 allocating 2, 500 hectares of land in the Department of 
Santa Cruz for the settlement of Ryukyuan emigrants. This agreement was the result 
of the active participation of the local pre-war Okinawan colony in Bolivia and the 
United States government (through different agencies) and it had political repercussion 
in the political meaning of the emigrants once they left Okinawa.
In this chapter I will deal with two different sets of connections that made the 
Ryukyuan emigration program to Bolivia possible and convenient for the U.S. First, I 
will explore the reasons which explain the rationale behind choosing Bolivia as a 
hosting state for Ryukyuan immigration from the perspective of the U.S. -  Bolivia 
relations. Then, I will analyse the connection between U.S. interests in Bolivia and 
those in Okinawa. Particularly I will analyse the role of Dr. James Tigner, the man who 
promoted and eloquently articulated the benefits of the Ryukyuan emigration to Latin 
America. Finally, I argue that the body of the immigrants came to represent and play a 
key role in global U.S. policies
As discussed in chapter 2, the idea of promoting emigration of thousands of 
Okinawan people was based in the strategic importance of the Ryukyu Islands as 
cornerstone of the U.S. military defence in the Pacific -which needed to be protected 
from social threats. Also, the Ryukyu emigration program can be explained by the 
hegemonic position that the U.S. had in the world in the 1950s which carried the
178"Resoluciön Suprema No. 57311.", Junio 18, 1953. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
62
responsibility to look after the global liberal system. 179 Therefore, the emigration 
program had more to do with the United States’ geopolitics than with the 
socioeconomic conditions in the islands. 180 Now, if the Ryukyu emigration project was 
the result of the hegemonic position of the U.S., were the hosting states chosen 
following the same principle? That is to say that Bolivia was selected due to its strategic 
value for the U.S. policy and not necessarily for the emigrants’ benefit. In this chapter 
I will assess the political factors that made Bolivia the destiny for the first groups of 
Okinawan emigrants.
There are other levels of connections that made the emigration program 
plausible and are relevant in order to understand the Ryukyuan emigration to Bolivia. If 
the emigration program started in Bolivia was because there was a connection between 
the Bolivian Ryukyuans, people who emigrated from Okinawa during the emigration 
process prior the Second World War and the U.S. interest in Asia. In this regard I will 
analyse the role of Dr. James Tigner who ‘connected’ the local Bolivian-Okinawan 
community’s plan for hosting emigrants and the USCAR’s necessity for a solution to 
their problems in Okinawa.
The Okinawan emigrants also deserve special attention from a microphysical 
perspective. Their “bodies” were not only first line witnesses of global politics but also 
the subject of a specific discourse of power. 182 They were symbols of the U.S. military 
power in Okinawa and abroad. Therefore, even though they were leaving direct U.S.
179 See Webb and Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment."
180 Supra chapter 2.
181 It should be noted that Bolivia vis-a-vis other potential hosting nations was the poorest, thus as
Endoh suggests, promoting labour migration to a poorer country could be considered to be a paradox. 
Endoh, Exporting Japan: Politics o f Emigration toward Latin America. ppl63-164., Also, in 1954, Bolivia's 
real GDP per capita was lower than in Japan proper. See Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, 
Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at 
the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006.
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_retrieve.php. Visited on 28-08-2009.
182 Suzuki, Embodying Belonging: Racializing Okinawa Diaspora in Bolivia and Japan, p.8.
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authority there was a microphysical link between the emigres and the sender. The future 
of the emigrants was connected with the image of the U.S. as guarantor of stability. So 
the question here is how can we interpret the role of the Okinawan emigrants within the 
bigger international relations picture?
3.1. The U.S. -  Bolivia connection.
The agreement signed by the Bolivian president in 1953 enabled the settlement 
of Okinawan immigrants in the region of Santa Cruz. This agreement was the result 
of the active participation of the local pre-war Okinawan colony in Bolivia and the 
United States government (through different agencies). It also permitted the conducting 
of a ten year program with an original aim of bringing 3,000 Ryukyu families to
1 O A
Bolivia. Bolivia was thus chosen by the U.S. authorities to be the first hosting nations 
of a mass migration project. ' Since the American authorities had the capacity to direct 
the migration How, I consider it valid to ask to what extent the choice of Bolivia as 
hosting country reflects the global U.S. policy.
The U.S. policy towards Latin America changed with the beginning of the Cold 
War and the fight against International Communism. The U.S. authorities, concerned 
with the spread of pro-Soviet groups in the hemisphere, started to support friendly 
governments in the region, mainly through aid and military assistance. In Bolivia, with 
the arrival of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) to power in 1952, 
the U.S.-Bolivian relations were strengthened due to the commitment of the MNR
183"Resoluciön Suprema No. 57311.", Junio 18, 1953. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
1 8 4 IL-JIbid.
185 When I say that Bolivia was "chosen" by the U.S. as a recipient nation for Okinawans, I am appraising 
an international migration case from an international relation perspective. The nation's ability to control 
its own borders is the sine quo non of its own sovereignty; hence, sovereign states have the capacity to 
regulate migration flows. Hollifield, "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We "Bring the 
State Back In"?." pp.141-142.
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government to combat communism and the aid and technical assistance given by the
U.S.
Before 1952, U.S.-Bolivia relations were centred chiefly in the tin industry, 
Bolivia’s main source of foreign currency. In the 1940s, Bolivia’s tin industry was the 
second largest producer of tin in the world and the first not controlled by a colonial 
power. Thus, during the world war Bolivia was a key hemispheric ally of the United 
States, providing tin and other minerals at a U.S. controlled price. However, after the 
war, the international price for tin dropped and the U.S. was unwilling to continue 
buying at the same price as during the war, so negotiated a lower value. As the Andean 
nation’s funds diminish, Bolivia -a  country which imported most of its staple food- 
suffered famine. Consequently, Bolivia from the end of the war to 1952 without much 
funding found itself in a series of changes of governments and coup d’etats.188
In 1952 a revolution put in power the MNR, a moderate leftist non-aligned party 
which was supported for a large spectrum of Bolivia’s political forces. It was led by the 
democrat and anti-imperialist Victor Paz Estenssoro. Nevertheless, the U.S. authorities 
considered that the MNR was a key domestic force limiting the chances for the full
189development of a Communist movement.
In the 1950s, Latin America became a more important strategic region in U.S. 
global policy. From a hegemonic stability perspective, the U.S. was responsible for the 
development of the markets in the region as well as for keeping the hemisphere free of 
communism. The Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, John M. Cabot, stated
186 Kenneth D. Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership (London: The University of 
Georgia Press, 1999). p.62.
187 Some authors have argued that Bolivia lost money not selling its minerals in open market.Ibid, pp.78- 
80.
188 Ibid. p.95. Each family was considered to have four members, hence the agreement allowed the 
entrance of 12,000 people.
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clearly the aim of the U.S. relations with the hemisphere in 1953: “Practically 
everybody in the United States agrees on our policy objectives in this hemisphere. We 
want good relations with our sister Republics. We want to cooperate with them. We 
want peace and democracy and continental solidarity and due process of law and 
sovereign equality and mutual assistance against aggression”.190 It was particularly this 
last point, “assistance against aggression” which moved millions of dollars in military 
assistance to Latin America. As reported in The Department of State Bulletin in March 
1953, the reasons for military assistance were articulated in Cold War rhetoric: “1. This 
hemisphere is threatened by Communist aggression from within and without; 2. The 
security of strategic areas in the hemisphere and of inter-American lines of 
communication is vital to the security of every American republic; and 3. The protection 
of these strategic areas and communications is a common responsibility”.191 The fight 
against communism was so fierce in the Americas that the U.S. government between 
1951 and 1952 allocated around ninety million dollars for direct military assistance to
• 1Q?Latin America.
Although the U.S. had a general Latin America policy, Bolivia was treated in a 
special way. The collapse of the mining industry due to low international prices created 
great instability in the Andean country and increased the possibilities for a communist 
triumph. Secretary of State Dulles, in a letter to the director of the foreign operations 
administration Harold Stassen, explained why the situation in Bolivia could be 
dangerous for the security of the United States.
190 This is part of a speech given to encourage export managers to invest in Latin America. John M. Cabot, 
"U.S. Capital Investment in Latin America," The Department o f State Bulletin XXVIII, no. 718 (1953). 
p.460.
191 N/A, "Military Assistance to Latin America," The Department o f State Bulletin XXVIII, no. 718 (1953). 
p.464.
192 Ibid.. About half of the money that the Marshall Plan allocated for the Greek reconstruction and to 
fight Communist insurgency in the Balkans in 1948.
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“(...) Bolivia faces economic chaos. Apart from humanitarian considerations, 
the United States cannot afford to take either of two risks inherent in such development: 
(a) the danger that Bolivia would become a focus of Communist infection in South 
America, and (b) the threat to the United States position in the Western Hemisphere 
which would be posed by the spectacle of United States indifference to the fate of
1 QO
another member of the inter-American community.”
Bolivia in the early 1950s became the focus of the U.S. aid in South America 
and even though the MNR’s Bolivia was not a sound pro-U.S. government, it ensured at 
least a pro-democratic and anti-communist position.194 As John Cabot explained the U.S. 
aid in Bolivia: “if we believe in democracy, it is surely our duty to deal with regimes 
solidly based on the consent of the governed, even if they differ somewhat from us in 
their concepts of government (...) we have common interests vastly more important 
than our differences. We face alike the implacable challenge of communism”.195 Of 
course, this change in the U.S. approach surprised the Bolivian government which, 
pressed by the strained economy of the nation, promptly accepted the U.S.’ aid.196 The 
initial aid for 1953 was 9 million dollars which helped to ease the critical situation in 
Bolivia.197 Milton Eisenhower in his report on his trip to South America in 1954 stated: 
“The emergency aid extended Bolivia by this government has been of fundamental 
importance in easing the critical situation and preventing Bolivia’s rapid descent into
193 Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1952-1954, vol. 4. The American 
Republics (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983). p.535.
194 For an early analysis and bibliographic discussion of the MNR government see Charles W. Arnade, 
"Bolivia's Social Revolution, 1952 - 1959: A Discussion of Sources," Journal o f Inter-American Studies 1, 
no. 3 (1959)..
195 John M. Cabot, "Inter-American Cooperation and Hemisphere Solidarity," The Department o f State 
Bulletin XXIX, no. 748 (1953).
196 Guillermo Bedregal, Victor Paz Estenssoro, El Politico: Una Semblaza Critica (Mexico: Fondo de 
Cultura Economica, 1999). p.467.
197 Although the aid for Bolivia was criticized in the U.S., Milton Eisenhower and the President supported 
it since "the aid was quite experiment in regional cold war hegemony". Lehman, Bolivia and the United 
States: A Limited Partnership, p.112.
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economic chaos with consequences that could have been favourable only to 
Communists...Our extension of aid to Bolivia had immediate success from the 
viewpoint of our political interests through the strengthening of moderate members of 
the government and by making it possible for them to take increasingly strong steps 
against Communist elements in the country.”
Due to the critical shortage of foodstuff in Bolivia, the initial aid was used to 
import staples (mostly from the U.S.) and ease the famine. The Bolivian government, 
dependant now on the U.S. aid, initiated a program of agricultural development in order 
to cope with the internal demand of food.199 By 1950s the agriculturally rich region of 
Santa Cruz was underpopulated so the Paz government in order to have more people 
working the land in the region encouraged internal migration from the highlands 
towards the east.200 The potentialities of the region were recognized by the authorities in 
the U.S. and in Bolivia. Oscar M. Powell, country director of the U.S. Technical 
Assistance Program in Bolivia (also known as Point Four) concluded that efforts would 
be directed towards expanding agricultural production of Santa Cruz. For instance, 
the U.S. government supported investment in developing the Santa Cruz region and 
constructed an all weather road to Santa Cruz. However the internal migration was 
not as successful as planned since the people from the highlands were not willing to 
leave their ancestral lands. Then the Bolivian authorities, convinced that the number of
Confidential supplement to the Milton Eisenhower report (n.d) quoted in Ibid. pp.120-121.
199 Bedregal, Victor Paz Estenssoro, El Politico: Una Semblaza Critica. p.452.. For a legal commentary on 
the Agrarian Reform see Jesus de Galindez, "Decree-Law No. 3464 on Agrarian Reform," The American 
Journal o f Comparative Law 3, no. 2 (1954).
200 For a review of the internal migration in Bolivia see Allyn MacLean Stearman, Camba and Kolia: 
Migration and Development in Santa Cruz, Bolivia (Orlando: University Presses of Florida, 1985).
201 Tigner, "The Ryukyuans in Bolivia." p.221.
202 Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership, p.117. The Harry Truman inaugural 
address in 1949 contained the famous Point Four Program, with the objective of "making the benefits of 
our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of 
underdeveloped areas". See Ravi Kanbur, "The Economics of International Aid," in Working Paper 
Department o f Applied Economics and M angement (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2003).
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necessary migrants would not be accomplished by internal migration alone, opened the 
doors for international immigration to the region of Santa Cruz.203
From a Bolivian perspective, the Okinawa immigration plan had as its main 
objective to diversify the Bolivian economy and increase the production of foodstuff 
and other crops. Thus by promoting Ryukyuan emigration the U.S. government was 
also assisting the Andean economy. The agreement providing funds for Okinawan 
immigration signed by the Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Colonization Dr. 
Alcibiades Velardes C. and the acting Director of the United States of America 
Operations Missions to Bolivia Dr. Anthony Donovan stated: “The plan consists of a 
colonization scheme based on the immigration of Okinawans to carry out agricultural 
pursuits. The agricultural development of potentially rich areas which at present have a 
limited number of inhabitants is an imperative need in Bolivia, with the objective of 
diversifying the economy of the country by augmenting the production of foodstuff and 
other crops. One means of obtaining this increase in agricultural production is by aiding 
the immigration of groups which, because of their dedication to agricultural pursuits, 
can contribute to the healthy development of the potential agricultural and livestock 
resources of the country” . 204 In other words, the Ryukyuan emigration plan fitted 
smoothly in the U.S. strategic purposes in Bolivia.
To sum up, the arrival of groups of immigrants to Bolivia (particularly from 
Okinawa) was due to the influence that the U.S. government had in Bolivia. 
Development policies were, as explained above, part of a hemispheric strategy to 
strengthen democratic governments and diminish Communist groups in the continent.
203 For a complete analysis of the colonisation in Eastern Bolivia see J. Valeri Fifer, "The Search for a 
Series of Small Successes: Frontiers of Settlement in Eastern Bolivia," Journal o f Latin American Studies 
14, no. 2 (1982).
204 "Program of American Economic Assistance, project No. AE-C-5" April 1954. In NA RG.319.270.18. 
ex.60 box30.
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Thus, the United States as hegemon of the liberal world, in order to ensure political 
stability and support regional markets, delivered large-scale military and financial aid as 
well as helping in a small scale to certain development projects such as agricultural 
international migration. Although the size and relative importance of the Okinawan 
immigration to Bolivia is small compared to other projects, it is an excellent example to 
understand the rationale behind the American assistance.
3.2. The “Tigner” connection.
James Hollifield suggests that international migration can be seen as the function 
of economic forces, rights, and networks. ' In the case of the Okinawan migration to 
Bolivia we can observe these three elements given that: Bolivia promised land and thus 
a better economic life; in Okinawa, due to the U.S. occupation, people enjoy limited 
rights, so going to Bolivia was a way to escape from the pressure of U.S. occupation; 
and finally international migration is characterised by the existence of networks with the 
hosting country. Networks of immigrants increase the likelihood of international 
movement because they lower the costs and risks of movement." The immigration to 
Bolivia was possible because there were active and “already-there” Okinawan groups. 
In this section I will analyse different connections that made the Ryukyuan emigration 
plan conceivable, particularly the role of Dr. James Tigner who connected the local 
Bolivian-Okinawan community’s immigration plan and the U.S. authorities’ necessity 
for a solution to their problems in Okinawa.
In the early 1950s the Pacific Science Board of the National Research Council, 
under the direction of Harold J. Coolidge, launched studies to facilitate the U.S.
J Hollifield, "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We "Bring the State Back In"?." p.145. 
206 Massey et al., "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal." p.448.
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occupation of Okinawa.“ The Council at the explicit request of Brig. Gen. James M. 
Lewis, Civil Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands, included a survey of Ryukyuan 
immigration to South American countries with exploration of possibilities for 
resettlements or colonisation. The Council in cooperation with the Hoover Institution 
of Stanford University and funds from the U.S. Department of the Army assigned James 
Tigner, a PhD candidate in Latin American history at Stanford University, to this 
mission.209 Therefore, Tigner became the hinge between South America and the U.S. 
interests in Okinawa.
During the course of nine months, Tigner visited 12 Latin American countries 
finding Ryukyuan residents in six of them (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico 
and Peru). However, in a memorandum to H.J. Coolidge in November 1952, Tigner 
considered: “the Santa Cruz region of Bolivia to be the most hopeful for Ryukyuan 
colonization in the immediate future”. The main reason for this appreciation was that 
whilst visiting Bolivia, Tigner met the local Okinawan community who had -even 
before knowing about Tigner’s visit- started to design an immigration program in 
support of their countrymen. On December 25, 1949, Gushi Kancho, the leader of the 
Okinawan group in Riberalta, proposed the idea of bringing Okinawans to Bolivia, and 
the following year, with the assistance of Jose Akamine from Santa Cruz, looked for 
available land suitable for new immigrants. They found some privately owned land 
east of Rio Grande next to a large area owned by the central government (Figure 3).
207Sellek, "Migration and Nation-State: Structural Explanations for Emigration from Okinawa." pp.83-84., 
Amemiya, "Reinventing Population Problem in Okinawa: Emigration as a Tool of American Occupation.".
208 Tigner, "The Ryukyuans in Bolivia." p.220.
209 The project started in 1951 and ended in 1954. Ibid.
210 "Memorandum", November 15, 1952. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
211 This plan was designed as a possibility in the future to help their countrymen but had not institutional 
endorsement from the USCAR.
212 The record of the activities of the Okinawan group in Bolivia comes from a three-volume 
handwritten journal kept in the Okinawan Association in Santa Cruz. A brief description is given in 
Amemiya, "Reinventing Population Problem in Okinawa: Emigration as a Tool of American Occupation."
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Having in mind a potential land grant from the government, the exploration group 
bought some land and in 1951, the group established the “Uruma” Agricultural and 
Industrial Society, organization qualified to apply for land grants. Therefore, when 
Tigner visited Bolivia in May 1952 there was already a basis for a large Okinawan 
immigration. What Tigner needed to do was first to help to organise a mass migration 
project and then persuade the U.S. authorities of the convenience of the idea.214 As a 
result, Tigner first requested to the Uruma Society members to produce a more concrete 
project and then he started to pull as many strings as he could. The immigration project 
was ready just a few months later, and included the society’s accomplishments 
(including the 12,500 hectares purchased).
Figure 3. Map of Bolivia.
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213 The Uruma Society began also contacts with the Okinawan Government and the Okinawa Overseas 
Association, Ibid..
214 The Uruma Society's project originally was conceived to bring 50 families only.
215 "Plan of Colonization: Japanese (Okinawan) Immigration by the 'Uruma' Agricultural and Industrial 
Society" October 1952, NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
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After his tour in Latin America, Tigner moved swiftly. He went to Tokyo and spoke 
to the deputy Chief o f the Japanese Emigration Section who educated him about the 
Japanese emigration-colonization program in Brazil.216 A few days later Tigner went to 
Okinawa where he met General Lewis, Civil Administrator o f the Ryukyu Islands, and 
made his initial proposal for emigration to Santa Cruz region in Bolivia which caught the 
interest o f Gen. Lewis.217 By the end o f the week he briefed Gen. Lewis and other officials, 
including General Robert S. Beightler, Deputy Governor about the emigration plan. During 
his stay in Okinawa, Tigner also on several occasions met Higa Shuhei, Chief Executive o f 
the Government o f the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), other members o f the GRI, staff members o f 
the USCAR, and representatives o f the Okinawa Overseas Association.218 Prior to his 
departure from Okinawa, Gen. Lewis approved the plan and agreed to allocate $160,000.- 
o f USCAR funds for transportation o f the first group. On his way back to California Tigner 
stopped for two days in Hawaii and had a meeting with members o f the local Okinawan 
Association. Since most o f the remittances reaching Okinawa come from Hawaii, Tigner 
considered necessary to obtain their support.219 Even before the project was approved in a 
higher level, informal contacts were made with the Bolivian government authorities so that 
to allow the mass migration plan; Also, Tigner kept correspondence with Dr. Oscar M. 
Powell from the Point Four mission in Bolivia, who gave his opinions and 
recommendations to the program.22'1 In brief, James Tigner provided the initial links among 
the interest o f the local Bolivian-Okinawan, the U.S. authorities in Okinawa, and eventually 
the U.S. authorities in Bolivia. It should be noted that in my research I did not find strong 
evidence suggesting that the Uruma Society plan or Tigner’s report were properly revised or 
criticised until the first group o f immigrants arrived in Bolivia. Nevertheless, Tigner’s
From this meeting Tigner realised that the Japanese could initiate contacts earlier with the Bolivian 
Government and hinder the Okinawan immigration.
217 Tigner's letter to Dr. Harold J. Coolidge. October 7, 1952. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
2 1 8  I U - JIbid.
219 ....Ibid.
220 "Memorandum: Ryukyu Emigration -  South America" September 20, 1952. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 
box30.
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conclusions on the subject were constantly cited to support the emigration plan by the U.S. 
authorities. James Tigner was effective in convincing as many people as possible about the 
urgency and convenience of the Ryukyuan emigration plan. Once Tigner had put forward 
his plan, the initiative to start with the program needed to come from higher rank officials.
Figure 4. Koshin Shikiya (Pdt. Ryukyu University), Dr. J. Tigner, and Taira Tatsuo 
(Gov. Okinawa) Naha 1951.221
Negotiations were conducted at different levels so as to bring about the Ryukyuan 
Emigration program. Firstly, the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Island and the 
Commander in Chief of the Far East Command agreed with the emigration plan and 
requested support from the Department of the Army. Lt. Colonel R.W. Allen, Chief of the 
Public Affairs Division helped to link the emigration plan and other U.S. agencies. Then, 
the Public Affairs Division requested technical assistance to the American Foreign 
Operations Administration (FOA) in order to assess the financial and technical needs 
for implementing the P lan.221 At the same time, negotiations with the Bolivian
221 Museo Histörico Okinawa Bolivia t  f  t  7  ' f  'J U T http://dms-
okinawabolivia.eg.iomm.ip/top.htmlPicture N°320. Visited on October 17, 2010.
222 Letter from R.W. Allen to Mr. Peterson. August 28, 1953. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
223 Ibid.
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government started in 1953 and soon after the President of Bolivia approved the 
migration plan and allocated 2,500 hectares to the Uruma Society. Also, the Bolivian 
president promised land grants up to 50,000 hectares depending on the success of the 
program.224 Since the main concern of the Bolivian government was the initial funding 
once the immigrants arrived, the Bolivian side requested that B$.35,000,000 or about 
U$ 139,000. be deposited into the Uruma’s account before the arrival of any 
immigrant. This problem was negotiated by FOA’s representatives. In view of the 
fact that for the year 1953 the U.S. government had offered -as mentioned above- 
US 9,000,000 to the Bolivian Government in aid, FOA representatives talked to
Bolivian Foreign Minister who agreed to use some of these funds for colonization
226programs.
Figure 5. Bolivian president Dr.Victor Paz Estensoro shaking hands with Inamine 
Ichiro. March 1954.227
"Resettlement of Okinawan Emigrants in Bolivia" July 1, 1953. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
225 "Memorandum for the record", November 10, 1953. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
2 2 6  . . . .Ibid.
227 Museo Histörico Okinawa Bolivia t  f  t  7  f  'j k" 7  l E f U http://dms- 
okinawabolivia.eg.iomm.ip/top.htmlPicture N°316. Visited on October 17, 2010.
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In addition, the government of the Ryukyu Islands sent an emigration mission to 
South America and the United States in 1953. " Inamine Ichiro, head of the mission, in 
the name of the Ryukyu Government met with the American officials of Point Four and 
of FOA in Bolivia to discuss further the scope of the program. Also, as commissioner of 
the GRI and representative of the Colony “Uruma”, Inamine signed the act of agreement 
with the Bolivian Government stating the outline of the program."" He also met the 
highest American authorities involved in the process in a meeting in the Pentagon in 
March 1954. In that meeting the Department of the Army, Department of State, FOA, 
Pacific Science Board, and the GRI were represented." Inamine’s initial statement in 
that meeting followed the results of the Tigner’s report and then summarized what had 
been achieved until then. Also, the Department of State agreed to approve the 
expenditure of B$ 35,000,000 in the program.2’1 Although the Ryukyuan Emigration 
program was approved by U.S. and Bolivian authorities and funds for the first group 
were guaranteed, the future of the emigration to South America required a permanent 
source of funds.232
It was clear that for ensuring the continuity of the emigration program a stable 
and permanent loan institution was needed. In August 1953 a joint military-civilian 
conference held in GRI agreed that the enactment of an emigration bank law will serve
228 The mission members were Senaga Hiroshi from Economic Policy Planning Bureau, GRI, and Inamine 
Ichiro, president of the Ryukyu Oil Company and president of the Ryukyu Overseas Association.
229 "Act of Agreement Subscribed Between the Representatives of the Colony "Uruma", The Minister of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Colonization and Point Four", March 8. 1954. RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
230 "Emigration of Ryukyuans to Bolivia", March 22, 1954. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
231 Since the only problem for proceeding with the program was a delay from the Department of State in 
approving the Bolivian Government's expenditure of the B$35,000,000.- Inamine in the Pentagon's 
meeting press on effectively Mr. John L. Topping, officer of the Bolivian Desk, to accelerate the process. 
Ibid.
232 Emigration to Brazil was also discussed and it was agreed that only after sending the first group to 
Bolivia a Brazilian emigration program could be established. "Ryukyuan Emigration to Brazil and Bolivia" 
June 9, 1953. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
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as legal basis for raising emigration funds. ' On November 1 1, 1953, the Emigration 
Bank Bill was promulgated and became effective the same day (GRI Legislature, in Act 
No. 85 of 1953). The Emigration Fund Foundation (also called Emigration Bank) was 
established with an initial authorized capital of R¥100,000,000 (or U$833,333) to be 
subscribed by the GRI. The foundation loaned money to emigrants for passage and 
settlement expenses at a 6% interest rate with provision for repayment within ten 
years. With the new banking institution, the process which started with Tigner’s trip 
culminated in a comprehensive emigration program which connected different groups 
within the United States sphere of influences.
In conclusion, the Okinawan emigration process to Bolivia was possible because 
of a strong networking between the pre-war Okinawan groups Ryukyu authorities 
(civilian and military) who desired to promote emigration. The initial hinge between 
these two groups was Dr. James Tigner, who took the Uruma Society’s plan for 
immigration and promoted it everywhere. As the idea gained acceptance, the project 
was taken to a higher level and negotiated. One consequence of this was that the Uruma 
Society lost influence on its own project. On the other hand, the project became more 
elaborate, including support from a financial institution and the support from different 
U.S. organization in the region such as Point Four and FOA.
3.3. The emigrants’ role in global U.S. policies.
We have so far discussed the socio-political situation in Okinawa, the 
hegemonic position of the U.S. in Asia and in the Americas, and the connections
233 Weekly Intelligence Digest, August 14, 1953. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
234 Ryukyu Shimpo, November 12, 1953. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
235 The first year GRI paid the sum of U$ 83,333.- and the balance was paid within four years. "Financing 
the Ryukyu Emigration to South America", April 5, 1954. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
236 The Emigration Bank was replaced in 1960 for the Ryukyuan Overseas Emigration Corporation. Civil 
Affairs Activities 1960 p29.
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between Bolivia, Okinawa and the U.S. Now I would like to analyse the role of the 
Okinawan emigrants in the broader Cold War scenario, or in other words, the link 
between the emigrants (and their bodies) with the U.S. hegemonic power. I will focus 
on the first group of immigrants since they synthetised all the American and Okinawan 
expectations placed on emigration.
The Ryukyuan emigration project appealed to the population. Many Okinawans 
were upset with the U.S. administration and labour conditions (supra chapter 2). More 
than 50% of the emigrants had at one time or another been employed by the military 
bases, and according to a survey conducted in the early 1980s amongst the Okinawan 
first generation immigrants (Issei) in Bolivia, 10% of them cited their dislike of living 
under the U.S. occupation as a primary reason for their decision to emigrate. So when 
the Government of the Ryukyu Islands officially launched the selection process for the 
first group of emigrants to go to Bolivia, an “emigration fever” -as Yoko Sellek named 
it- broke out in Okinawa. There is evidence which shows how the project caught the 
attention and interest of thousands of Okinawans. Inamine Ichiro in a letter to Lt. Col. 
R.K. Lieding from the Department of the Army noted that the government of the 
Ryukyu Islands received thousands of applications for available places on the scheme, 
at a rate of 10 to 1. In Bolivia, the news was that the first group was selected from over
For survey results see Suzuki, Embodying Belonging: Racializing Okinawa Diaspora in Bolivia and 
Japan, p.30. According to Amemiya own field work, almost all immigrants had worked for the U.S. 
military. Kozy Amemiya, "The Bolivian Conection: U.S. Bases and Okinawa Emigration," in JPRI Working 
Paper (JPRI: Japan Policy Research Institute at teh USF Center for the Pacific Rim, 1996).
238 Sellek, "Migration and Nation-State: Structural Explanations for Emigration from Okinawa." p.84. 
There are differences among scholars about the total number of people that actually emigrated in the 
first year. Figures vary mainly due to the fact that some scholars do not consider the three emigrants 
that travelled by air, considering in the addition only those who did the trip by ship; also, the official 
number agreed in the immigration contract with the Bolivian government was set in four hundred so 
some authors follow that number; and finally, the fact that during the trip there were three newborns. 
According to Inamine, three people travelled by plane, 269 people travelled in Junes, 129 in July and 
together with the three newborns that makes 404 people. Inamine's letter to Lt. Col. Lieding, July 18, 
1954. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
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ten thousands requests. ' The main point here is that the possibility to emigrate was 
considered to be a very good news for Okinawa as stated in the Ryukyu Shimbun “A 
good news that migration is possible (...) to Okinawa (...) this realization of emigration 
is the biggest news” .240 And also, the few selected to go in the first group carried with 
the expectation and hope of the rest of the island.241
The emigrants' bodies, particularly the ones of the first group of four hundred 
people approximately, became a site of great symbolic work and symbolic production, a 
material for a “corporal inscription” .242 In a Foucauldian interpretation, the bodies of the 
emigrants were also involved in a political field where power relations had a hold upon 
them; in this case, the politics of U.S. security policy in Asia and in the Americas. In 
other words, the bodies of the emigrants were a symbolic production of the U.S. control 
in Okinawa which made people willing to leave and at the same time, they were a useful 
force to expand the image of the charitable hand of the hegemon in Bolivia.243 In this 
‘political economy’ of the emigrants’ bodies, the U.S. saw in the outcome of the 
Ryukyuan emigrational project a means to expand a positive image of itself in the 
Americas and Okinawa which ultimately was another weapon against U.S. critics 
abroad. Hence, the emigrants’ bodies were connected with the global U.S. role and their 
success in Bolivia was related with the success of the hegemon to maintain stability in 
the liberal world.244
The U.S. authorities were concerned with the international repercussions on the 
U.S. image that the situation in Okinawa could have. Although the emigration program
Ibid. Also, Press Interview with Bolivian Minster of Agriculture, August 18, 1954. NA RG.319.270.18. 
ex.60 box30.
240 "Daily Okinawa Press Summary" March 1, 1954. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
241 Inamine's letter to Lt. Col. Lieding, July 18, 1954. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
242 Discussion in Suzuki, Embodying Belonging: Racializing Okinawa Diaspora in Bolivia and Japan.pp.8-9. 
243Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin 
Books Lt., 1975). pp.25-29.
244 Webb and Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment."
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was conceived in Okinawa as a security policy to reduce population and social tension, 
by 1954 it was clear for the U.S. authorities in Okinawa and in Washington that the 
emigration program was not only about assisting Ryukyuans but also to improve U.S. 
image abroad. In the Committee on Foreign Relations in Washington there was a strong 
belief that the strict military control and land confiscation were fuel for Communist fires 
whom through propaganda could exploit these issues.24:> John A. Swezey, former chief, 
Immigration Section, USCAR, in a letter to Richard Nixon, Vice President of the U.S. 
in June 1954, stated as one of the emigration program’s goals the “creation of better 
American-Ryukyuan and American-South American relations”.246 In his opinion, the 
“military occupation, lack of adequate compensation for the U.S.-used land, failure of 
the U.S. to define the international status of the Ryukyu Islands, and the personal 
relations between the U.S. and the Ryukyuan people are considerations contributing to 
anti-U.S. feelings in the Ryukyu Islands”." One of the main problems for Swezey was 
that these anti-U.S. feelings were used by Communists and Leftist groups abroad, so in 
order to thwart critics “U.S. sponsorship of emigration may be capitalized upon to U.S. 
advantage in psychological warfare upon U.S. critics abroad”. In other words, 
emigration was seen as a means to combat a propagandist front of the Cold War.
As president Eisenhower stressed during his visit to Okinawa in 1960, the U.S. 
wished to present to the world, the U.S.-Okinawa relations as “a splendid example of 
mutual benefits that result when people of goodwill work toward the common goal of
245 "Commentary on the Special Study Mission Report to the House Committee on Foreign Relations" 
n/d. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
246 "Ryukyuan Emigration, An outline", letter from J.A. Swezey to Vice President R. Nixon. June 3, 1954.
NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
247 ... ,Ibid.
248 . . . .
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peace and friendship in freedom”.249 Thus, the USCAR, worried for the U.S.-Okinawa 
relations and its impact overseas, organised different activities and organisations in 
Okinawa to promote a friendly relationship. For instance the Friendship Week of May 
1953 had the political purpose of aiding “in a mutual feeling of trust and respect 
between the native population and the military forces in the Ryukyu” and for enhancing 
understanding between military and the people of Naha the Naha Ryukyuan-American 
Friendship Association was formed." I do not attempt here to describe the whole U.S.- 
Okinawa friendship movement but to emphasize the importance that it had for U.S. 
authorities to promote a positive image of themselves in Okinawa and in the rest of the 
world. In this regard, the emigration program was an asset since put the U.S. in the clear 
position of benefactors of the Okinawans by organising and promoting emigration.251
Figure 6. Farewell to the first ship that went to South America in 1954.
"Remarks of the President at Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa", printed in The High Commisioner of 
the Ryukyu Islands, "Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands."
250 "Report of Government and Political Developments -  May 1953" Jun 4, 1953. NA 
RG.260.B190.2/l.ex.2169.FRCs603. Folder 14.1.
251 "Daily Okinawa Press Summary" March 1, 1954. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
252 Museo Histörico Okinawa Bolivia f  f  t  7  'J U T http://dms-
okinawabolivia.eg-iomm.ip/top.htmlPicture N°007. Visited on October 17, 2010.
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Nevertheless, the Ryukyuan emigration was a double-edge sword for U.S 
interests. A well developed and successful emigration process could nourish a positive 
image of the U.S. military occupation in Okinawa and U.S. aid in South America. But if 
the emigration program was delayed hindering the opportunity of a better life to some 
Okinawans, or even worse, if the Ryukyuan emigrants were not thriving in their new 
destination, the U.S. image would pay the political costs for such a “failure”. For this 
reason it was imperative for the U.S. to provide as much assistance as possible to the 
emigrants once in Bolivia. Norman D. King, Chief of the Public Affairs Division called 
for the State Department to assume responsibility of providing protection for the 
emigres, because “failure to do this, will undoubtedly result in assumption of 
responsibility by Japanese Mission” and it could have aired the idea of U.S. lack of
V i
concern for their Okinawan subjects. Also, the news that the settlement of a Japanese 
Government sponsored colony was being discussed with the Bolivian authorities ignited 
the preoccupation of the U.S. authorities.254 C.F. Hawley, officer in charge of Japanese 
Affairs in the State Department suggested that “it would be rather embarrassing if the 
Japanese started their emigration program and we do nothing” so it was necessary to
255start as soon as possible with the selection of emigrants and their travel preparations. 
This was very important because, as mentioned earlier, the emigrants’ failure to achieve 
a self-sustainable life in Bolivia would be considered also an U.S. failure and eventually 
utilised in anti-U.S. propaganda by Leftist and Communists in Japan or elsewhere.
253 "FOA Report on Emigration Possibilities in Bolivia", September 3, 1954. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 
box30. For a description of the ambiguous status of the immigrants in Bolivia see Sellek, "Migration and 
Nation-State: Structural Explanations for Emigration from Okinawa." pp.84-86.
2j 4 For a study on the Japanese community in Bolivia see Stephen Thompson, "San Juan Yapacam: A 
Japanese Pioneer Colony in Eastern Bolivia" (University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign, 1970).
255 "Memorandum for the record", November 10, 1953. NA RG.319.270.18. ex.60 box30.
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Figure 7. The Okinawan migrants in Uruma, Bolivia. September 1954.
To sum up, the bodies of the emigrants were not only marked with the causes 
that propelled their departure but also they bared the corporal inscription of their linkage 
with the United States within a propaganda context. The Ryukyuan emigrants were 
considered the U.S.’s unofficial ambassadors in a way. They were symbols of the U.S. 
power and what it is more relevant, living evidence of the U.S.-Okinawa friendship and 
the benevolence of the U.S. authority in the Ryukyu Islands as well as in Bolivia. 
Therefore, the success of the immigration process was not only relevant for the 
Okinawan people as they could expand the number of hosting countries and reduce 
social and political tensions in the islands, but also for the U.S. as they were fighting a 
war that required to maintain an image of moral superiority.
3.4. Chapter Conclusions
The Ryukyuan Emigration Program was first thought of as a policy to improve
security rather than a means for improving people’s life. However, the emigration
256 Museo Histörico Okinawa Bolivia T T T *7 #  'J U T http://dms-
okinawabolivia.eg. iomm.jp/top.htm I Picture N°319. Visited on October 17, 2010.
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program could never be initiated without a series of connections which enabled and 
explained the option of promoting emigration to Bolivia. Hence, the main conclusions 
to be drawn are:
There was a strong connection between the U.S. hemispheric interests in South 
America, particularly in Bolivia, and the concession from the Bolivian government to 
allow and allocate land for the Okinawan immigrants. Development policies were, as 
explained above, part of a hemispheric strategy to strengthen democratic governments 
and diminish Communist groups in the continent. Thus, the United States as hegemon 
of the liberal world, in order to ensure political stability and support regional markets, 
delivered large-scale military and financial aid (part of which was used to fund the 
Okinawan immigration) as well as helping in a small scale to certain development 
projects such as agricultural international migration. Also, Bolivia was an ideal place 
for Ryukyuan resettlement due to the existence of an active Okinawan community in 
Bolivia. In this regard, the connection made by Tigner between the local Okinawan- 
Bolivian and U.S. interests in Asia trigged the emigration program and was conducive 
for the engagement of higher rank officials with the project. Finally, the emigrants 
played a role of reflecting the U.S. power everywhere. The Okinawan people’s distress, 
their fervent and enthusiastic support to emigration, and their directing of migration to 
Bolivia show the imprints of an occupied land where people lived in poverty. In the 
emigrants themselves the power of the United States gained visibility; therefore, the U.S. 
authorities sought to use the emigration program and the emigres as part of their Cold 
War propaganda.
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CHAPTER 4
Conclusion
The program that promoted emigration from Okinawa to South America, 
particularly to Bolivia, presents many fascinating issues connected with the American 
postwar strategic position in the Pacific and Asia and the role that Okinawa and its 
inhabitants played for the U.S. global security strategy. The ambiguous international 
status of the islanders perpetuated U.S. control over the islands and provided the basis 
for more radical measures. The promotion of emigration was integrally connected with 
U.S. military objectives in the region and the necessity to “secure” the islands from 
social unrest. Finally, the fact that Okinawan emigrants travelled to Bolivia connects the 
U.S. global strategy to halt Communism in both sides of the Pacific whilst supporting a 
friendly nation.
In relation to international migration theories, the study of the Okinawan 
emigration program in the 1950s highlights the fact that security considerations may 
play an important part in migration, and thus that both sender and receiver states may 
play a major role in international migration. Since the end of World War II, U.S. 
strategic objectives in Asia have shaped the sociopolitical conditions of the Okinawan 
people. The control of the islands, confirmed by article 3 of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty and rationalized in Dulles’s ‘residual sovereignty’ theory, allowed the U.S. 
military to transform Okinawa into a true American bulwark in the Pacific. For the U.S. 
policy makers the security of ‘the keystone’ in the Pacific was connected with the 
security of the free world. Therefore, controlling the local population was an important 
consideration in the global U.S. security. The role of the state in creating and promoting
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migration policies has to be seen in this context. Hence, this thesis helps, firstly, to 
highlight the role of the sender state as a main actor in international migration; and 
secondly, to show that security considerations can be part of emigration projects.
As a result of the U.S. control and transformation of Okinawa, serious issues 
emerged: among them poverty, loss of property and demographic expansion. The 
inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands grew hostile to the U.S. military and voiced their 
opposition through different social and political movements such as the “reversion 
movement”. These social pressures have to be counted as key factors that propelled 
emigration in Okinawa; however, the emigration movement could not have materialized 
without the consent of the American authorities who agreed to organize, fund and 
promote it. The military governmental saw in all these problems a true threat to its 
strategic objectives in the Ryukyu Islands, and therefore it considered promoting 
migration as a security policy. Since the United States was the world’s hegemonic 
power in the 1950s and as hegemon had to look after the stability in the liberal system, 
the “Ryukyuan Emigration Program” was supported with the aim of protecting the 
political stability of Okinawa and thus of the liberal world.
The emigration program also needs to be considered from a global perspective. 
The U.S. authorities tried not only to put forward security policies in Okinawa but also 
assist friendly governments. The initial hosting nation was Bolivia, a country 
economically dominated by the United States in the early 1950s. For the United States, 
Bolivia was a valuable nation in their struggle against international communism; 
therefore, millions of dollars in aid (mainly foodstuff) went to support the Andean 
nation development programs and to keep Communists away. Bolivia’s agrarian reform 
was aimed to increase the production of staples and in this way support the nation’s 
economy. However, the main problem for pursuing agrarian reform was the lack of
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experienced farmers within Bolivia willing to migrate to the department of Santa Cruz, 
a region with rich soil and sparse population. The U.S. saw promoting Okinawan 
migration to Santa Cruz as a way not only to quell social tensions in the Ryukyu Islands 
but also to assist the Bolivian economy. The reasons behind the selection of Bolivia as 
destination for the Okinawan emigrants again reflect the U.S. global security policy 
against communism. Moreover, the Ryukyuan Emigration program was also used by the 
U.S. authorities to promote the ‘good face’ of the liberal world. The program gained 
visibility particularly because of the political and social conditions in Okinawa. 
Therefore, the fate of the emigration program was connected with the image that the 
U.S. wanted to show to the rest of the world. In the context of propaganda, the image of 
the U.S. as reflected in the emigrants’ bodies was another weapon to fulfil the United 
States role during the Cold War.
The Hegemonic Stability theory provides a theoretical background for 
understanding Ryukyuan emigration in the \950s. The 11ST places the hegemonic state 
in the centre of the international economic relations as the element that ensures stability 
in the economical world order. We could also expect that the hegemon, in the name of 
the liberal democratic world, could exert its power in social and military areas as well. 
In the Cold War years, ideology permeated the policy making process in the hegemonic 
country. The Ryukyu Emigration program was the product of U.S. military 
requirements in the islands and gained support in the State Department since it could 
benefit other regions. Therefore, the Okinawan migration to Bolivia is a good example 
of a policy which reflects the a) American security needs in Okinawa, and b) the global 
scope of the U.S. hegemonic role.
The study of the Ryukyuan emigration to Latin America can be further 
developed by approaching this case from other perspectives. For instance, in terms of
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the inhabitants of Okinawa and the USCAR administration we could ask to what extent
the emigrational program was successful in dealing with the overpopulation and social 
security problems. Also, we could follow up by analysing the first groups of emigres 
and their lives in Bolivia: did they obtain what was promised when they left Okinawa? 
Was life in Bolivia better than in the Ryukyus? Another line of research could connect 
the emigre with the U.S. Cold War policy; we could ask what impact had the fate of the 
emigres in the hosting countries for the U.S. image overseas? How the American 
authorities managed the new communities in Bolivia? Finally, another line of research 
could consist in trying to find similar cases of colonial/semi-colonial emigration 
programs. What can we learn from the U.S. migration policies in other territories like 
Panama, Guam, or Bonin islands? Eventually, we could try to find similar examples in 
the British Empire in the nineteenth century that could have similar characteristics. In 
sum, security policies may affect the movement of people, and finding further evidence 
of this is an open challenge for future research.
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